Afterimages and Sensation

Phillips, Ian

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00580.x

Cited by 20 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 90 publications

(110 reference statements)

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“…The kind of organised societies in which humans live, and aspire to live, lends credence to the fact that we are not under illusion in any absolute sense. These examples are, in effect, why the argument from illusion failed to impress some innerchamber epistemologists (Phillips, 2013).…”

Section: Critical Implications For Science and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

Odozor¹,

Akintona²

2019

Ujah J. Art Hum

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This paper is a hermeneutic exposition of the problem of illusion in sense perception, using the methods of critical and content analysis as tool of engagement. For decades, post-modern epistemology was steeped in the murky waters of the brilliant, sceptic argument from illusion, according to which the senses could not be relied upon for knowledge of the external world of reality, due to problems believed to be inherent in sensory perception. Why was the argument from illusion so important to epistemologists as to elicit enormous interest for such a long time? What are the implications of the argument for science? Did the argument from illusion portend any real danger for the foundations of empirical knowledge claims, as supposed by many frontline epistemologists? Exploring the concept and science of perceptual illusion, and the implications of the argument from illusion for science and epistemology, the paper found that the argument failed as a refutation of direct realism because it views illusion as the norm rather than an exception, and portrays human knowing process as an automatic, rather than a procedural, gradual phenomenon.

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Section: Critical Implications For Science and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

Odozor¹,

Akintona²

2019

Ujah J. Art Hum

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“…However, he also seems quite suspicious of the distinction between mere sensation and perceptual experience in general. This seems to be at least partly because he's interested in defending what he calls ‘purism’: the idea that visual experience can be characterized in terms of ‘a subject's apparent perspective on external, public reality’ without any appeal to qualia (Phillips, , p. 417). But one might be a purist about mere sensations, for example, by thinking that when we see pitch black we're presented with sensory qualities at specific locations of your visual field, yet claim that genuine perceptual experience goes beyond this in exhibiting objectification.…”

Section: Experiences Seemingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experience, Seemings, and Evidence

Reiland

2015

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and being fine‐grained. However, only the latter have furthermore a perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and related dualities of perspectivality/completion and variation/constancy. Second, I elaborate on the reasons for thinking that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences (= experiences) need to be distinguished from accompanying seemings that passively assign things into conceptual categories and thereby tell you something about them. For example, when you look at a red apple and have the relevant recognitional abilities it will also normally seem to you that this is an apple. Finally, I argue that the best version of the popular dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it's neither experiences nor seemings by themselves, but rather the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence.

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“…Ian Phillips has also argued that after‐images are perceptual experiences which seem to present us with externally located entities (namely, light‐phenomena; (Phillips, ). His argument is different from my own, since it involves denying that after‐image experiences possess some of the features I have listed.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

Gow

2019

European J of Philosophy

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The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist's claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology.

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Afterimages and Sensation

Cited by 20 publications

References 90 publications

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

A hermeneutic approach to the problem of illusion in sense perception

Experience, Seemings, and Evidence

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

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