Against epistemic absolutism

Lai, Changsheng

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02964-x

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 51 publications

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“…We can understand the conceptual nature of a notion by looking at how it is used in ordinary language. Contrary to popular belief, I am sceptical of this linguistic methodology (Lai, 2021; see also Hazlett, 2010). Therefore, in what follows, I will try to rely on linguistic evidence as little as I can.…”

Section: Laimentioning

confidence: 96%

Memory belief is weak

Lai

2023

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In a recent influential paper, Hawthorne et al. (2016) argue that the epistemic standard for rationally believing a proposition is lower than for rationally asserting it. In a slogan: "belief is weak". Given the close connection between knowledge and the norm of assertion (as well as the norm of belief) in contemporary epistemological literature, this debate has been extended to consider whether belief is weaker than knowledge (see Rothschild, 2020;Schulz, 2021aSchulz, , 2021bWilliamson, 2020). Generally, epistemologists who advocate that belief is weak reject two forms of entitlement equality: EE-K: The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for knowledge (cf. the knowledge norm of belief, Williamson, 2000). EE-A:The epistemic standard required by rational belief is the same as for assertion (cf. the knowledge norm of assertion, Williamson, 2000).

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Section: Laimentioning

confidence: 96%

Memory belief is weak

Lai

2023

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Remembering is not a kind of knowing

Lai

2022

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Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism

Lai

2021

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Epistemic absolutism holds that knowledge-that is ungradable, while epistemic gradualism argues the opposite. This paper purports to remodel the gradualism/absolutism debate. The current model initiated by Stephen Hetherington fails to capture the genuine divergence between the two views, which makes the debate equivocal, and the gradualist side lacks appeal. I propose that the remodeled debate should focus on whether knowledge-that is a 'threshold concept' or a 'spectrum concept'. That is, whether there is a threshold distinguishing knowledge from non-knowledge. The reconstructed model enjoys significant advantages as it enables the debate to be more balanced and philosophically interesting.

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Against epistemic absolutism

Cited by 3 publications

References 51 publications

Memory belief is weak

Memory belief is weak

Remembering is not a kind of knowing

Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism

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