Agent permeability, principal delegation and the European Court of Human Rights

Hawkins, Darren; Jacoby, Wade

doi:10.1007/s11558-007-9014-1

Cited by 14 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…47. See Alter 2006;Cortell and Peterson 2006;Gould 2006;Jacoby 2006 andLake 2007;andPollack 1997. 48.…”

Section: Terrorism As a Principal-agent Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics

Abrahms¹,

Potter²

2015

Int Org

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Certain types of militant groups—those suffering from leadership deficits—are more likely to attack civilians. Their leadership deficits exacerbate the principal-agent problem between leaders and foot soldiers, who have stronger incentives to harm civilians. We establish the validity of this proposition with a tripartite research strategy that balances generalizability and identification. First, we demonstrate in a sample of militant organizations operating in the Middle East and North Africa that those lacking centralized leadership are prone to targeting civilians. Second, we show that when the leaderships of militant groups are degraded from drone strikes in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal regions, the selectivity of organizational violence plummets. Third, we elucidate the mechanism with a detailed case study of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian group that turned to terrorism during the Second Intifada because pressure on leadership allowed low-level members to act on their preexisting incentives to attack civilians. These findings indicate that a lack of principal control is an important, underappreciated cause of militant group violence against civilians.

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“…47. See Alter 2006;Cortell and Peterson 2006;Gould 2006;Jacoby 2006 andLake 2007;andPollack 1997. 48.…”

Section: Terrorism As a Principal-agent Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics

Abrahms¹,

Potter²

2015

Int Org

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“…As a consequence, more desirable behavior may be chosen: monitoring, auditing, and periodical review of their activities are the conventional answers to this problem. However, IOs' heads have a perfect command of the tactics intended to undermine such controle.g., inviting third parties to evaluate their activities; preventing inspections on substantial issues by insisting on using solemn and formal procedures, known as "ceremonialism"; splitting their constituencies into groups that benefit from private information and those that do not, another sort of "dualism" (Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006, 2008.…”

Section: Dual Decision-making: Inertia or Innovation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bringing International Organization In: Global Institutions as Adaptive Hybrids

Schemeil

2013

Organization Studies

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How can an international organization be made adaptable? Having been designed to fulfil a specific mandate, international organizations should disappear from the world stage once .the initial conditions that led to their establishment no longer exist: their constituents (governments or activists) will not support them when their mandate becomes obsolete or their added value is reduced. Nonetheless, they survive external shocks, resource traps, and even the growing indifference of their founding fathers. The explanation lies in their successful resistance to constituents' control; counter-intuitive adaptation to external change; unplanned expansion through mandate enlargement; and a snowballing albeit unintentional trend to build up networks. Overall, the relative success of international organizations can be measured as a global balance between performance and resilience, exploitation and exploration, autonomy and cooperation. To reach that balanced stage they must be altogether dualistic (coupling the technical with the political); adaptive (converting slack into innovation); organic and ambidextrous (setting new challenges while pursuing current activity). Since they combine components that come from local, national, regional and transnational recipes for survival and performance, they are complex hybrids made up of public agencies, private firms, third sector associations, and expert, activist, or lobbying interest groups.

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“…Referring to new PA models, there are studies that develop PA relationships beyond the “simple” principal vis‐à‐vis agent interaction. For example, there are scholars who examine PA relationships between an agent and multiple principals (e.g., Hawkins and Jacoby ; Nielson and Tierney ). Alternatively, there are contributions that analyze PA relationships between a principal(s) and multiple agents (e.g., Damro ; Klein ) while another prominent example is the analysis of chains of delegation (e.g., Dür and Elsig ; Rasmussen ).…”

Section: Enter Principal–agentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hawkins and Jacoby (, ) identify four strategies that agents use in order to expand their influence—interpretation, reinterpretation, expanding permeability, and buffering.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Principal–Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story

Sobol

2015

Governance

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Principal-agent (PA) has come a long way since it was introduced to the political science sphere. Nowadays, PA has established itself as an institutional midrange theoretical framework that encompasses various methodological as well as theoretical approaches. This article argues, however, that scholars still assume, a priori, that the agent is an opportunistic and disloyal actor. This article seeks to question this theoretical assumption by demonstrating how principals could be as much problematic as their agents, a phenomenon that it terms "pathological delegation." In so doing, it offers a first analysis of the small strand of the literature that examines problems embedded in the principals' side as well as provides new empirical evidence in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Finally, the article posits that scholars should not treat pathological delegation as an anomaly but rather attempt to integrate, test, and develop new theoretical assumptions on this phenomenon.

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Agent permeability, principal delegation and the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract: Principal agent theory, Human rights, Judicial politics, International courts, International law, European integration, K33, N44, H49,

Cited by 14 publications

References 44 publications

Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics

Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics

Bringing International Organization In: Global Institutions as Adaptive Hybrids

Principal–Agent Analysis and Pathological Delegation: The (Almost) Untold Story

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