Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value

Woidtke, Tracie

doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00091-5

Cited by 347 publications

(212 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…First, I note that there are likely indexing constraints imposed on fund investment policies that mitigate the extent to which coefficient estimates are overstated due in part to selection bias. A number of papers find that pension funds, including public pension funds that do not solely aim to maximize shareholder value, are typically indexed (Woidtke 2002). As Table 2 indicates, similar to other pension funds, the vast majority of sample companies in the AFL-CIO holdings are members of the S&P 500, which suggests that indexing is relevant for union pension funds.…”

Section: Portfolio Selection Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

Agrawal

2011

Rev. Financ. Stud.

177

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Section: Portfolio Selection Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Others study whether public pension funds pursue political objectives at the expense of shareholder value (Romano 1993;Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999;Woidtke 2002). In contrast, this paper focuses on labor union pension funds, an important group of institutional investors that is widely considered the most vocal class of shareholder activists Starks 2000, 2007).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

Agrawal

2011

Rev. Financ. Stud.

177

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“…First, highly prestigious underwriters may use their reputation to certify the quality of a foreign IPO, and, thereby reduce adverse selection problems associated with new issues (Stiglitz, 1985). Second, highly prestigious underwriters may be involved in (Woidtke, 2002;Gillan and Starks, 2003). All of these factors reduce agency conflicts associated with new issues and should improve IPO performance.…”

Section: Prestigious Underwritersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign IPO capital market choice: Understanding the institutional fit of corporate governance

Moore

Bell

Filatotchev

et al. 2012

Strategic Management Journal

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While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, the integration of financial markets makes the choice of capital markets an equally important strategic decision. We advance a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. We find that internal governance characteristics (founder-CEO, executive incentives, and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication, and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms. Our results suggest foreign IPO firms select a host market where the firms' governance characteristics and third party affiliations fit the host market's institutional environment.3

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“…Indeed, these authors contend that the incentive structure of the public pension funds is such that it is rather surprising that we see them engaged in this activity at all. Woidtke (2001) tests this hypothesis by comparing the relative value of firms held for public versus private pension funds. She reports that relative firm value is positively related to private pension fund ownership and negatively related to (activist) public pension fund ownership.…”

Section: The Us Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives

Gillan¹,

Starks²

2003

Ownership and Governance of Enterprises

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We examine the role of institutional investors in financial markets and in corporate governance. In many countries, institutional investors have become the predominant players in financial markets and their influence worldwide is growing, chiefly due to the privatization and development of pension fund systems. Moreover, foreign institutional investors are becoming a significant presence, bringing their trading habits and corporate governance preferences to international markets. In fact, we argue that the primary actors prompting change in many corporate governance systems are institutional investors, often foreign institutional investors. In other countries the role of institutional investors is limited. Instead, large blockholders, often in the form of individuals, family groups, other corporations, or lending institutions are the dominant players. We present the theoretical arguments for the involvement of investors in shareholder monitoring and a brief history of institutional ownership and activism in the United States and other countries. We also discuss studies of the efficacy of such activism.We then examine differences in ownership structures around the world and the implications of the interactions of these ownership structures for institutional investor involvement in corporate governance. Although there may be some convergence in corporate governance systems across countries, because of the endogenous nature of the interrelation among the factors of corporate governance the evolution will most likely .../…

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Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value

Cited by 347 publications

References 33 publications

Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting

Foreign IPO capital market choice: Understanding the institutional fit of corporate governance

Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives

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