Agricultural Costs of the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load

Kaufman, Zach; Abler, David G.; Shortle, James S.; Harper, Jayson K.; Hamlett, J. M.; Feather, Peter

doi:10.1021/es502696t

Cited by 35 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Crumpton and Stenback [59] found that the creation of small reservoirs targeted to headwater streams draining cropland could reduce N flux substantially when A w :A r is <200. This contrasts to the high costs and uncertainty associated with many voluntary nonpoint abatement efforts that rely on locations of opportunity-rather than strategic locations where improved practices will generate the greatest effects on downstream delivery of pollution [60].…”

Section: Strategic Vs Opportunistic Views Of N Tradeoff Damsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Will Dam Removal Increase Nitrogen Flux to Estuaries?

Gold

Addy

Morrison

et al. 2016

Water

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Abstract:To advance the science of dam removal, analyses of functions and benefits need to be linked to individual dam attributes and effects on downstream receiving waters. We examined 7550 dams in the New England (USA) region for possible tradeoffs associated with dam removal. Dam removal often generates improvements for safety or migratory fish passage but might increase nitrogen (N) flux and eutrophication in coastal watersheds. We estimated N loading and removal with algorithms using geospatial data on land use, stream flow and hydrography. We focused on dams with reservoirs that increase retention time at specific points of river reaches, creating localized hotspots of elevated N removal. Approximately 2200 dams with reservoirs had potential benefits for N removal based on N loading, retention time and depth. Across stream orders, safety concerns on these N removal dams ranged between 28% and 44%. First order streams constituted the majority of N removal dams (70%), but only 3% of those were classified as high value for fish passage. In cases where dam removal might eliminate N removal function from a particular reservoir, site-specific analyses are warranted to improve N delivery estimates and examine alternatives that retain the reservoir while enhancing fish passage and safety.

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Section: Strategic Vs Opportunistic Views Of N Tradeoff Damsmentioning

confidence: 93%

Will Dam Removal Increase Nitrogen Flux to Estuaries?

Gold

Addy

Morrison

et al. 2016

Water

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“…Water quality trading analysts regularly produce ex ante empirical studies that show regulated sources could significantly reduce regulatory compliance costs by purchasing agricultural nonpoint nutrient reduction credits (Faeth, ; Fang et al ., ; Ribaudo et al ., ; Hanson and McConnell, ; Mehan, ; Sasaki and Caplan, ; Jones et al ., ; Van Houtven et al ., ; Perez et al ., ; Wainger et al ., ; Kaufman et al ., ). Costs typically include the financial costs of capital and operation and the maintenance associated with pollutant control technologies and practices.…”

Section: Water Quality Trading In the United Statesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Where Did the Agricultural Nonpoint Source Trades Go? Lessons from Virginia Water Quality Trading Programs

Stephenson

Shabman

2017

J American Water Resour Assoc

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Governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and agricultural organizations promote water quality trading programs as an innovative policy to engage agricultural producers in conservation activities. Cost analyses suggest regulated sources can reduce compliance costs by purchasing agricultural nonpoint source credits. Yet, such “point‐nonpoint” trades are rare. This article assesses the demand for agricultural nonpoint sources in well‐developed nutrient trading programs in Virginia for industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, municipal stormwater programs, and land developers. Evidence suggests nutrient trading programs in Virginia will not stimulate investments in pollutant reduction practices on working agricultural lands. The lack of demand for agricultural nonpoint source credits can be attributed to a substantial degree to the design features and incentives present in multiple overlapping regulatory programs. The legal setting that dampens regulated source demand for nonpoint source credits in Virginia is broadly representative of conditions found elsewhere in the United States.

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“…The inequalities imply each participating point source has multiple partners. This is because an individual unregulated point source tends to generate sizable emissions relative to an individual nonpoint source (although, in aggregate, nonpoint emissions may be greater; Kaufman et al ), implying that a point source's demand exceeds the effective supply from an individual nonpoint source. We write the number of partners more generally as Y z ( x , τ ), where x is the vector of demand and supply variables, and τ = [ τ Aw , w τ Ag , g τ Ag , w ] is the vector of trade ratios.…”

Section: The Permit Marketmentioning

confidence: 99%

When the Levee Breaks: Can Multi‐Pollutant Markets Break the Dam on Point–Nonpoint Market Participation?

Reeling

Horan

Garnache

2020

American J Agri Economics

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High transaction costs and thin participation plague water quality trading and prevent markets from delivering expected efficiency gains. Little prior work explores the relationship between transactions costs and market performance. We develop a model of point–nonpoint trading that includes transactions costs. Point sources (PS) generate a single pollutant, whereas nonpoint sources (NPS) generate multiple, complementary pollutants. Trading occurs via bilateral negotiation: regulated PS must find and contract with unregulated NPS to obtain pollution offsets. Each PS bears search and contracting costs that depend on the number of potential trading partners. The NPS sector does not pay search costs but may incur some contracting costs. These costs may affect participation decisions. Transactions costs may generate strategic complementarities that lead to multiple equilibria, characterized by large or small levels of market participation. The equilibrium at which the market arrives depends on sources' expectations about others' participation. We explore the effect of different market structures on trading outcomes. Allowing NPS to participate in multiple, distinct markets for each pollutant they abate may have little effect on the basin of attraction for trading. In contrast, integrated markets—in which regulated polluters can meet their caps by holding permits generated from abatement of either pollutant—can reduce transactions costs for both sources. This generates a larger basin of attraction around the full‐participation equilibrium and thus may improve the efficiency of pollution trading.

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Agricultural Costs of the Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load

Cited by 35 publications

References 8 publications

Will Dam Removal Increase Nitrogen Flux to Estuaries?

Will Dam Removal Increase Nitrogen Flux to Estuaries?

Where Did the Agricultural Nonpoint Source Trades Go? Lessons from Virginia Water Quality Trading Programs

When the Levee Breaks: Can Multi‐Pollutant Markets Break the Dam on Point–Nonpoint Market Participation?

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