Agricultural Export Restrictions and the WTO: What Options do Policy-Makers Have for Promoting Food Security?

Anania, Giovanni

doi:10.7215/ap_ip_20131115

Cited by 23 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Bolivia has also negotiated its accession agreement and could join pending approval from the member states' legislatures. The main sources of information in this and the previous paragraph are Crosby (2008), Mitra and Josling (2009) and Anania (2013).…”

Section: Objectives Of Export Taxesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Modifying agricultural export taxes to make them less market-distorting

Liefert

Westcott

2016

Food Policy

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Section: Objectives Of Export Taxesmentioning

confidence: 97%

Modifying agricultural export taxes to make them less market-distorting

Liefert

Westcott

2016

Food Policy

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“…Such was the case during the global food price spikes of 2007-2008 and 2010-2011, when several countries reacted to rising food prices by halting exports through withdrawal of export licenses, export bans, and other restrictions (Anania 2013). 8 As Martin and Anderson (2012) point out, such export restrictions exacerbated world price volatility by shorting world supplies.…”

Section: Disciplining Export Subsidies and Export Restrictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiating agricultural trade in a new policy environment

Institute¹

2019

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The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), established in 1975, provides research-based policy solutions to sustainably reduce poverty and end hunger and malnutrition. IFPRI's strategic research aims to foster a climate-resilient and sustainable food supply; promote healthy diets and nutrition for all; build inclusive and efficient markets, trade systems, and food industries; transform agricultural and rural economies; and strengthen institutions and governance. Gender is integrated in all the Institute's work. Partnerships, communications, capacity strengthening, and data and knowledge management are essential components to translate IFPRI's research from action to impact. The Institute's regional and country programs play a critical role in responding to demand for food policy research and in delivering holistic support for country-led development. IFPRI collaborates with partners around the world.

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“…One policy response to these events that has proved controversial has been the banning of exports by some countries, which has exacerbated the size of the spikes (Martin and Anderson, ; Anderson et al ., ). The choice of policy instruments in open economies to mitigate the effects of such upward spikes, however, remains elusive (Ivanic et al ., ; Anania, ), as has any co‐ordinated international response (Thennakoon, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contingent Tariff of the Special Safeguard Mechanism: What Happens When Markets are Imperfectly Competitive?

MacLaren¹

2015

J Agricultural Economics

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Contingent tariffs for agri-food commodities have been proposed as a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in the Doha Round negotiations by the G33 group of countries as an instrument to control downward spikes in their border prices and/or surges of imports. The objective is to safeguard the livelihood security of farm households in poor countries. To date, most analysis of such tariffs uses stochastic partial equilibrium models with perfect competition. Yet in many markets for such commodities, imperfectly competitive market intermediaries play an important role in determining producers' prices, as do state trading enterprises (STEs). A stochastic partial equilibrium model of a typical importing country situation is specified in which there are either imperfectly competitive domestic intermediaries with a contingent tariff or an STE. The role of these intermediaries in influencing price behaviour and livelihood security in the presence of contingent tariffs alters the conclusion based on models of perfect competition. Using Monte-Carlo simulation, it is shown that the efficacy of a contingent tariff is substantially reduced as the number of firms declines because increasingly they absorb the tariff, and the procurement price and producer surplus do not increase to the extent that they do under perfect competition.

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Agricultural Export Restrictions and the WTO: What Options do Policy-Makers Have for Promoting Food Security?

Cited by 23 publications

References 39 publications

Modifying agricultural export taxes to make them less market-distorting

Modifying agricultural export taxes to make them less market-distorting

Negotiating agricultural trade in a new policy environment

The Contingent Tariff of the Special Safeguard Mechanism: What Happens When Markets are Imperfectly Competitive?

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