Most food products can be classified as " credence" goods and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. The paper presents an analysis of the decisions of producers and consumers about a "credence" good in three institutional scenarios, which r eflect different levels of credibility of the regulation. The first scenario is a reference scenario in which the regulation is fully credible. In the second case considered there is no regulation, or, if there is, it is totally ineffective. In the third s cenario a regulation only partially credible provides consumers with an imperfect substitute for the information and trust they lack. Some of the producers of "low" quality goods share with the producers of "high" quality goods an interest in the introduction of a regulation as long as this is not fully credible. In addition, it may be the case that even producers of "low" quality goods who know they will not be able to sell their products labeling them as being of "high" quality may have an interest in supporting a not fully credible regulation. Finally, rather than having producers of "low" quality goods "block" the introduction of a fully credible regulation, producers of "high" quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached which leads to the approval of an imperfect regulation.

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This paper examines the domestic and international impacts of the u.s. Export Enhancement Program (EEP) for wheat. EEP uses targeted in-kind subsidies to expand U.S. exports and was designed specifically to compete with subsidized exports from the European Community (EC). We argue EEP cannot be welfare-improving for the U.S., even considering strategic trade theory. We then model EEP as an in-kind, constrained, targeted export subsidy and determine its price, quantity, and budgetary effects. Empirical results show that no exporting country gains from EEP and that the intended loser, the EC, is only slightly harmed. We find the export subsidies generate only a small increase in U.S. wheat exports. EEP is an expensive program; based on our estimates for 1988, government cost of additional wheat exports under EEP reached $469 per metric ton.

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