Most food products can be classified as " credence" goods and regulations exist to provide consumers with a substitute for the lacking information and trust. The paper presents an analysis of the decisions of producers and consumers about a "credence" good in three institutional scenarios, which r eflect different levels of credibility of the regulation. The first scenario is a reference scenario in which the regulation is fully credible. In the second case considered there is no regulation, or, if there is, it is totally ineffective. In the third s cenario a regulation only partially credible provides consumers with an imperfect substitute for the information and trust they lack. Some of the producers of "low" quality goods share with the producers of "high" quality goods an interest in the introduction of a regulation as long as this is not fully credible. In addition, it may be the case that even producers of "low" quality goods who know they will not be able to sell their products labeling them as being of "high" quality may have an interest in supporting a not fully credible regulation. Finally, rather than having producers of "low" quality goods "block" the introduction of a fully credible regulation, producers of "high" quality goods are better off when a compromise is reached which leads to the approval of an imperfect regulation.

No abstract

We evaluate the effectiveness of monetary incentives in enhancing student performance using a randomized experiment involving undergraduate students enrolled at a southern Italian University. Students were assigned to three different groups: a high-reward group, a low-reward group, and a control group. Rewards were given to the 30 best-performing students in each group. Financial rewards increase student performance. High-ability students react strongly whereas the effect is null for low-ability students. Large and small rewards produce very similar effects. These effects also persist in subsequent years, when the financial incentives are no longer in place. No types of crowding-out effects of the monetary incentives are found.

Our paper aims to shed light on regional multidimensional well-being inequalities in Italy. We first decompose the Theil index in its "within" and "between" components and we find that disparities in multidimensional well-being go beyond the historical GDP divide between the Centre-North and the South of Italy: "within" multidimensional well-being inequalities result to be as relevant as inequalities "between" these sub-national areas, suggesting that territorial-specific factors may be at work. Then, using a regional panel in the period 2004-2012, we analyse the relationship between multidimensional well-being disparities and regional institutional quality in terms of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption. We find that institutional quality matter in affecting regional multidimensional well-being inequalities and the effect varies heterogeneously accordingly to the level of public expenditure, institutional dimensions, and spatial spillovers. These findings indicate local policies could be better targeted to reduce gaps and increase expenditure efficiency, foremost among which are anti-corruption actions and measures to enhance the effectiveness of regulatory interventions, especially in regions which are lagging behind.

No abstract