Ahmadinejad, Iran, and Foreign Policy Dysfunction in Tajikistan

Abstract

Throughout the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tajikistan became, on the surface at least, an increasingly important political partner to Iran. Tajikistan according to Ahmadinejad was a “strategic partner” and in fact the two states' “common history and culture” made them inseparable. Ahmadinejad's emphasis on Tajikistan within Iran's broader foreign policy led to considerable discussion among regional observers and analysts who declared that the relationship between Iran and Tajikistan could potentially develop into a so‐called “Persian alliance,” which could reorder the regional political balance. However, lying just below the surface of relations between Iran and Tajikistan was a disjuncture between rhetoric and reality. This article argues that despite the public amity that existed between the two states, strong and substantive Iran‐Tajik relations were not achieved by the close of Ahmadinejad's presidency. This was due in part to a dysfunctional Iranian foreign policy approach, which often led to the mismanagement of this interstate relationship. This factor along with the unwillingness of Tajik elites to go from words to deeds and the broader impact of sanctions, international isolation, and regional rivalry, meant that Iran was largely unable to fulfill its prominent political and economic objectives in Tajikistan.

Iran’s Foreign Policy toward Tajikistan: Exploring the Effective Factors

“…Spiegel's (1969, 1970) works are the most important works in this domain. They (1970) define subordinate system as "consisting of one state or two or more geographically proximate and interacting states which share in some degree common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system" (p. 6). Based on this definition, "Central Asia as a core sector of a given region consists of a shared social, political, economic, or organizational background or activity among a group of states that produces a central focus of international politics in that region" (Bharti, 2020, p. 5).…”

“…Based on this definition, "Central Asia as a core sector of a given region consists of a shared social, political, economic, or organizational background or activity among a group of states that produces a central focus of international politics in that region" (Bharti, 2020, p. 5). Cantori and Spiegel (1970) define four pattern variables which explain regional politics as follows: (1) nature and level of cohesion; (2) nature of communications; (3) level of power; and (4) structure of relations. Central Asia is consisting of the four pattern variables (Bharti, 2020), and is only one of the core regional subsystems of international relations that constitute Central Eurasia (Cutler, 2007).…”

“…Suhrob Sharipov, the Director of the Tajik President’s Strategic Research Centre, in a private meeting with U.S. diplomatic officials expressed his concern regarding the close political engagement of Tajikistan with Iran. He maintained that the international reputation of the country can be tarnished by such an engagement (Clark, 2015).…”

“…In the negotiations related to the launch of the Iran-Afghan-Tajik TV channel, Asadullo Rahmonov as the chairman of the Tajikistan Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting stated that they will make Iranian female presenters do not wear hijab, in case the Iranian government forces Tajik female presents to wear hijab. Some Tajiks considered Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF) as a Torojan horse in Tajikistan, which aimed at propagating the values of Shi’a (Clark, 2015), since one of the main activities of these foundations was the distribution of Shi’ite religious books as well as Imam Khomeini’s books in Tajikistan (Shakir, 2017).…”

“…When the CA republics became independent in 1991, the expectations of regional governments and Iran were high regarding the further development of relations. However, despite the substantial potential of promoting bilateral and multilateral relations, Iran’s influence has remained limited (see for example: Shakir, 2017; Ahmadi, 2019; Clark, 2015) in this region. Mutual expectations to further the relations were rooted in a vision for greater spheres of possible cooperation between Iran and the CA states.…”