2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2009.04.001
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Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion

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Cited by 66 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…Zhang et al (2010) find that when there is competition among multiple airports in a region, a dominant strategy is for airports to cooperate with their dominant carriers and thus enable themselves to compete more effectively with other airporteairline pairs. Barbot (2009b) also finds that similar incentives exist for collusion between airports and airlines, including the case in which a secondary airport and a low-cost carrier compete with the main airport and full service airlines. In short, when an airport faces competition from another airport e either an adjacent airport sharing a similar market or another hub airport competing for connecting traffic e it is in each airport's interest to form an alliance with one airline, normally the dominant carrier.…”
Section: Regulatory and Policy Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 86%
“…Zhang et al (2010) find that when there is competition among multiple airports in a region, a dominant strategy is for airports to cooperate with their dominant carriers and thus enable themselves to compete more effectively with other airporteairline pairs. Barbot (2009b) also finds that similar incentives exist for collusion between airports and airlines, including the case in which a secondary airport and a low-cost carrier compete with the main airport and full service airlines. In short, when an airport faces competition from another airport e either an adjacent airport sharing a similar market or another hub airport competing for connecting traffic e it is in each airport's interest to form an alliance with one airline, normally the dominant carrier.…”
Section: Regulatory and Policy Implicationsmentioning
confidence: 86%
“…Recent studies suggest that the growth of dominant airlines, and vertical arrangements with airports, affect the equilibrium of aviation markets, leading to interactive dynamics between hub carrier performance and airport development (see Barbot, 2009;Zhang et al, 2010;Fu et al, 2011;Homsombat et al, 2011;Yang et al, 2015, for example). This implies that Chinese carriers have not yet fully leveraged the market potential and domestic dominance at their hubs in order to develop international services.…”
Section: Liberalization Policy Preferences Of Chinese Airlines and Humentioning
confidence: 99%
“…11 This setting is analytically tractable and allows us to focus on the dynamics of airport competition through concession services and to draw interpretable results. Moreover, as explained in Barbot (2009), this assumption may be plausible as there are two (horizontally differentiated) transportation services available. However, when only one service is supplied, it is more likely that there are potential passengers located too distant from the airport, for whom the reservation price exceeds the total costs of flying.…”
Section: The Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%