Al Qaeda's Third Front: Saudi Arabia

Riedel, Bruce; Saab, Bilal Y.

doi:10.1162/wash.2008.31.2.33

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Salafi jihadist propaganda began to be active in Sinai in 2011 after the overthrow of President Mubarak. Salafist propaganda began focusing on grievances against the local Bedouin population exercised by the state and warning local people against cooperating with state agencies (Riedel, 2011). Salafi jihadism presented an ideology capable of recruiting among the Bedouins as it highlighted their grievances, offered parallel services, and offered an alternative vision of the status quo.…”

Section: Sinai Insurgency—grievances Opportunities and Framing Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Localization of the counterinsurgency in Sinai: A case study on integrating local population into counterinsurgency combat operations in Sinai

Saad

2024

Digest Mid East Studies

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Integrating local militias in the counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Sinai has achieved tangible successes. The presence of local fighters contributed to the penetration of the Islamic State—Sinai Province network. The integration of locals into the ongoing COIN process has imposed a degree of local participation in local governance and decision‐making. Nevertheless, this article argues that there are two approaches to local integration into the COIN operation; the first is institutional integration, in which the state integrates local fighters at an institutional level in the ranks of the security apparatus. The second is the collaborating militia approach. In this pattern, the state resorts to warlords and tribal chiefs to mobilize irregular militias, coordinating with the regular forces in the COIN process without formally merging them into security institutions’ ranks. The Egyptian model in the Sinai is one of the latter type. The collaborating militia integration approach into COIN operations contributes to wooing elites to create narrow patronage networks of cronies, preventing systematized community participation in the decision‐making process, which leads to keeping the factors of rebellion alive below the surface even if the rebels are defeated militarily.

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Section: Sinai Insurgency—grievances Opportunities and Framing Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Localization of the counterinsurgency in Sinai: A case study on integrating local population into counterinsurgency combat operations in Sinai

Saad

2024

Digest Mid East Studies

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“…For example, Saudi Arabia was ill-prepared for the threat of an Iraqi invasion in 1990, thus prompting the government to host American troops as a deterrent. Saudi Arabia's decision to allow American troops within its borders was widely criticized by religious leaders and was one of the main grievances of Osama Bin Laden (Riedel and Saab, 2008). Questions were also raised about how the Saudi government misallocated its resources (Abalkhail, 1993).…”

Section: The Direct and Indirect Effects Of External Threatsmentioning

confidence: 99%

External Threats, Capacity, and Repression: How the Threat of War Affects Political Development and Physical Integrity Rights

Artabe

Chapa

Sparkman

et al. 2023

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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How do external threats affect leaders' incentives to repress? We argue that external threats both increase and decrease state repression, but through different causal pathways. Directly, external threats provide leaders with political cover to use repression against political opponents. Indirectly, threats incentivize leaders to augment state capacity, which decreases the likelihood of state repression. To test this argument, we develop a new latent measure of external threat using a Bayesian measurement model. We use mediation analysis to examine the direct and indirect effects of external threats on repression in developing countries from 1980 to 2016. We find that external threats increase government repression directly, but indirectly decrease repression through stronger state capacity. Our findings have implications for how international factors connect to domestic politics to help explain state repression. In addition, our new measure of external threat will help scholars study the consequences of the international threat environment.

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“…AQC's preferences for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula are embodied by the fact that Al Qaeda's 2003 campaign in the Gulf-launched due to a direct command from bin Laden himself 43 -was based and waged almost exclusively in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, much of the Saudi-based AQAP's literature conflated waging jihad in the Peninsula with doing so in Iraq.…”

Section: The "Natural Fortress": Al Qaeda Central Strategic Discoursementioning

confidence: 99%

Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Loidolt¹

2011

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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authorities in the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates intercepted explosive packages that had been placed on U.S.-bound planes. Less than a year earlier, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives aboard Northwest Flight 253. These attacks originated and were organized in Yemen under the supervision of a local Al Qaeda affiliate known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. These attacks are a manifestation of the group's growing international ambitions, yet little scholarship on Al Qaeda explores how affiliates with robust ties to Al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan balance their dedication to global and local jihad(s). This article contends that despite its strong ties to Al Qaeda Central and international posture, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula still must maintain local relevance and support. Its ability to do so carries implications for counterterrorism policymakers and the broader Al Qaeda movement.

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Al Qaeda's Third Front: Saudi Arabia

Cited by 13 publications

References 2 publications

Localization of the counterinsurgency in Sinai: A case study on integrating local population into counterinsurgency combat operations in Sinai

Localization of the counterinsurgency in Sinai: A case study on integrating local population into counterinsurgency combat operations in Sinai

External Threats, Capacity, and Repression: How the Threat of War Affects Political Development and Physical Integrity Rights

Managing the Global and Local: The Dual Agendas of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

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