Aligning strategy to threat: a baseline anti‐terrorism strategy for hotels

Abstract

Although the threat of terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon for hotels, limited literature exists on measures that hotels can take to prevent them or limit their damage. The purpose of this paper is to propose a baseline strategy to address this threat. Design/methodology/approach: Using the terrorist attack cycle and the security function models introduced in this paper, nineteen hotel security experts, members of an international working group on terrorism, were tasked to reach consensus on a baseline anti-terrorist strategy for a hotel. To reach this consensus, the study employed the Nominal Group Technique. Findings: The study presents a six-step baseline anti-terrorism strategy and a series of measures and actions under each step. In the centre of this strategy lies the disruption of the terrorist attack cycle. Research limitations/implications: There are limitations inherent to the Nominal Group Technique which may not allow the generalisability of the findings. However, every effort was made to ensure the reliability and validity of the study. Practical implications: The study suggests a shift from physical protection alone to a more intelligence-led approach. Counter-surveillance, terrorist behavioral analysis, higher visibility of security measures, stronger relationships with local community leaders, collaborative relationships with emergency response agencies and strategic use of risk intelligence providers will have to take a higher place in the agendas of hotel security departments. Originality/value: The paper presents for the first time two models that industry practitioners will find useful when designing security policies: the terrorist attack cycle and the security function model. Each component of the proposed strategy provides a

Terrorism, rugby, and hospitality: She׳ll be right

“…Paraskevas's (2013) anti-terrorist strategy for hotels recommends steps to take at both low and high-risk levels. Implementing some of these recommendations would go some way to making many hotels safer against terrorist attacks, while also addressing more likely risks such as fire.…”

“…As all hotels are regarded as soft targets for terrorists (e.g. Paraskevas, 2013), the sample included properties hosting teams, officials, media, dignitaries, volunteers and supporters.…”

“…Wernick and von Glinow (2012) noted an increase in attacks on hotels since 9/11, especially luxury properties, whereas Paraskevas (2013) argues that all hotels are vulnerable, citing the 2010 attacks on both the Park Residence and Hamid guesthouses in a secure area of Kabul.…”

“…Paraskevas, 2013;Pizam, 2010;Wernick & Von Glinow, 2012). The following section will therefore overview the approach taken to determine the attitudes of hotel managers towards security for the RWC2011, with particular emphasis on the potential for a terrorist attack.…”

“…Given the considerable literature about terrorists' use of international, media-friendly and high-profile events to publicise their causes to the international community (Hassan, 2012;Paraskevas, 2013), it seemed common-sense that the New Zealand government and emergency services would work with stakeholders such as the hospitality and events industries, to ensure the RWC2011 could not be disrupted by terrorists (see Bergesen, 2006;Larobina & Pate, 2009;Ruby, 2002). However, authorities focussed their attention instead, on how to host and move large numbers of people around, and how to manage intoxicated fans (Dudding, 2010;McRoberts, 2010;Vass, 2010).…”