All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof

Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro

doi:10.3982/te5111

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Other related papers include Troyan ( 2019 ), who studied obviously strategy‐proof allocation via the popular Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms, and provided a characterization of the priority structures under which TTC are OSP‐implementable. 10 Following our work, Arribillaga, Massó, and Neme ( 2020 ) and ( forthcoming ) characterized the voting rules that are obviously strategy‐proof on domains of single‐peaked preferences. Bade and Gonczarowski ( 2017 ) studied obviously strategy‐proof and efficient social choice rules in several environments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Pycia

Troyan

2023

ECTA

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We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon). Agents may update their so‐called strategic plan as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of simplicity standards which require that the prescribed action leads to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what happens outside the planning horizon. We employ these standards to explore the trade‐off between simplicity and other objectives, to characterize simple mechanisms in a wide range of economic environments, and to delineate the simplicity of common mechanisms such as posted prices and ascending auctions, with the former being simpler than the latter.

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