Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition Situations

Browne, Eric C.; Frendreis, John P.

doi:10.2307/2110957

Cited by 89 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Empirical studies of GL's performance typically include as a regressor the share of ministries in the coalition government controlled by each party (Browne and Franklin, 1973;Browne and Frendreis, 1980;Schofield and Laver, 1985;Laver and Schofield, 1990;and Warwick and Druckman, 2001). 32 The three-player treatments considered here, for which the minimum integer representation is (1, 1, 1), allow us to nest the predictions of DB and GL in a simple specification.…”

Section: Relationship Of Results To Field Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gamson's Law (Gamson, 1961) is a popular empirical model of the legislative bargaining process. Gamson's Law is not based on any explicit game theoretic formulation of the legislative bargaining process, but rather owes its importance in the literature to the strong empirical regularity reporting proportionality between cabinet posts and votes contributed to the ruling coalition in parliamentary democracies (Browne and Franklin, 1973;Browne and Frendreis, 1980;Druckman, 2001, 2003). One of the great appeals of Gamson's Law is its intuitive nature and the parsimony it offers, as it is independent of the game form underlying the legislative bargaining process.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

Fréchette¹,

Kagel²,

Morelli³

2005

Games and Economic Behavior

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Section: Relationship Of Results To Field Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

Fréchette¹,

Kagel²,

Morelli³

2005

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…This is not true empirically, a finding first published over 40 years ago. 6 Nonetheless, GL itself has proved extraordinarily robust to replication, even when different cabinet portfolios are assigned very 4 (Bassi 2013;Carroll and Cox 2007a;Laver et al 2011;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013) 5 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) different empirical weights. 7 On the other side of the paradox we find canonical alternating offers models of legislative bargaining, with an intellectual pedigree traceable to Rubinstein (1982), adapted to legislative bargaining by Baron and Ferejohn (1989 .…”

Section: The Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The second proposition is stated ex post, knowing the identity of the formateur. The propositions are therefore not contradictory because they apply in 7 Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Fréchette et al 2005b;Gamson 1961;Laver et al 2011;Schofield and Laver 1985;Warwick and Druckman 2006;Snyder et al 2005) 8 Snyder et al 2005) 9 (Snyder et al 2005: 982) 10 (Snyder et al 2005: 992) different settings, but this highlights a critical distinction between ex ante and ex post models of cabinet portfolio distribution. The paradox is therefore both simple and striking.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems

Cutler¹,

Marchi²,

Gallop³

et al. 2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Government formation in multiparty systems is of self-evident substantive importance, and the subject of an enormous theoretical literature. Empirical evaluations of models of government formation tend to separate government formation per se, from the distribution of key government payoffs such as cabinet portfolios between members of the government that forms. Models of government formation are necessarily specified ex ante, absent any knowledge of the government that forms. Models of the distribution of cabinet portfolios are typically, though not necessarily, specified ex post, given knowledge of the identity of some government "formateur" or even of the full partisan composition of the eventual cabinet. This disjunction lies at the heart of a notorious contradiction between predictions of the distribution of cabinet portfolios made by canonical models of legislative bargaining, and the robust empirical regularity of proportional portfolio allocations -"Gamson's Law". We resolve this contradiction by specifying and estimating a joint model of cabinet formation and portfolio distribution, which for example predicts ex ante which parties will receive zero portfolios rather than taking this as given ex post.We conclude that canonical models of legislative bargaining do add to our ability to predict government membership, but that portfolio distribution between government members conforms robustly to a proportionality norm … we suggest because portfolio distribution follows the much more difficult process of policy bargaining in the typical government formation process.Cabinet formation and portfolio distribution in European multi-party systems / 2

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“…This strong empirical regularity contradicts canonical bargaining models in predicting no formateur advantage. GL has been tested and retested many times and is remarkably robust (Browne and Franklin 1973;Browne and Frendreis 1980;Gamson 1961;Laver and Schofield 1998;Druckman 2001, 2006). This generates what Warwick and Druckman (2006) call the "portfolio allocation paradox".…”

Section: Extension Of Bargaining Models To N-party Legislatures With mentioning

confidence: 99%