2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.005
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Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games

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Cited by 25 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…Ellis (2018) provides recent discussions of the principles and analyzes their implications for game theory. They are also central in Battigalli et al (2019).…”
Section: Dynamic Models For the Trust Game With And Without Ambiguitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ellis (2018) provides recent discussions of the principles and analyzes their implications for game theory. They are also central in Battigalli et al (2019).…”
Section: Dynamic Models For the Trust Game With And Without Ambiguitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, despite SCBB, learners are likely to establish correct inference on the current best alternative since it has been sampled more than other underexplored alternatives. Ambiguity aversion would thus make exploration even more difficult, as an underexplored alternative, which is subject to a false-negative belief, is likely to be further discounted [16,43]. e persistence of SCBB despite some exploration indicates that biased belief for the optimal alternative is deeply entrenched in the existing belief system.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They show that a higher ambiguity aversion implies a weaker incentive to deviate from an equilibrium strategy. Moreover, Battigalli et al 51 discuss self‐confirming equilibrium in sequential games with different attitudes to ambiguity. However, none of these studies handles the types of ambiguity addressed in the framework proposed in this paper.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%