Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism

Oliveira, Luis R. G.

doi:10.1111/papq.12145

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…I won't pursue that line of argument here, but see Perrine (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of the doxastic puzzle and matters of responsibility. 17 I have argued elsewhere against versions of evidentialism stated in terms of prescriptive ought-claims (Oliveira 2017(Oliveira , 2018a, and against internalist notions of justification stated in agential terms (Oliveira 2015(Oliveira , 2018b).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Oliveira¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Oliveira¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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“…I won't pursue that line of argument here, but see Perrine (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of the doxastic puzzle and matters of responsibility. I have argued elsewhere against versions of evidentialism stated in terms of prescriptive ought-claims (Oliveira 2017(Oliveira , 2018a, and against internalist notions of justification stated in agential terms (Oliveira 2015(Oliveira , 2018b.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Duties

McCain¹,

Stapleford²

2020

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There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

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“… Both Sylvan (2018) andMillar (2019) reject the idea that knowing P entails believing P in response to reasons one has for believing P. Though, asSylvan (2018) andMillar (2019) are careful to point out, this doesn't imply that one lacks propositional justification to believe P if one knows P.3 SeeSilva (2017a),Oliveira (2018 andforthcoming), andBeddor (2017), for recent contrasting discussions of the relation between epistemic justification and other normative properties.…”

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confidence: 99%

Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification

Silva,

Oliveira

2023

The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence

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IntroductionEpistemologists distinguish between two notions of epistemic justification: having justification to believe that p versus justifiedly believing that p. To keep track of these notions, epistemologists typically refer to the former as propositional justification and to the latter as doxastic justification. 1 The most obvious difference between these notions is that propositional justification does not require belief: one can have justification to believe p without actually believing it. Consider, for example, someone who knows that Simon said he would be home, and knows that Simon is reliable. Other things being equal, this person could go on to justifiedly believe (that is, to have a doxastically justified belief) that Simon is probably home. But this person might simply not have this belief at all. In such a case, one would still have propositional justification to believe that Simon is probably home.Most epistemologists, however, tend to think that there is more to doxastic justification than merely forming a belief in what one has propositional justification to believe. Most agree that being doxastically justified depends on there being an appropriate connection between one's reasons for believing that p and one's actual state of believing that p. Someone who believes that p on a whim, for example, lacks a doxastically justified belief that p, even if she has fantastic reasons for believing that p that were left unengaged. The nature of this appropriate connection, of course, is a matter of debate.Bearing all of this in mind, we can state what we will call the reasons-first picture of propositional and doxastic justification:1 This distinction was originally introduced by Roderick Firth (1978) as 'propositional warrant' and 'doxastic warrant'. The terminology for the same distinction has differed among epistemologists. Some prefer 'ex ante justification' and 'ex post justification' (cf. Goldman 1979), some prefer 'justification ' and 'well-founded belief' (cf. Feldman and Conee 1985), and some prefer 'justifiable ' and 'justified' (cf. Pollock and Cruz 1999).Propositional Justification (PJ): S has propositional justification to believe that p iff S has sufficient epistemic reasons to believe that p. Doxastic Justification (DJ): S has a doxastically justified belief in p iff (i) S haspropositional justification to believe that p, (ii) S believes that p, and (iii) S's belief in p is appropriately connected to S's sufficient epistemic reasons to believe it. These characterizations are quite common, and they bear on a variety of important philosophical disputes. First, there is the matter of the nature of the truth connection responsible for the epistemic character of the relevant kind of justification. Internalists and externalists have different answers, and this will impact one's views on the nature of epistemic reasons and, consequently, on the nature of justification. We will try to stay neutral on this debate. Second, there are a range of cases where agents arguably have knowledge but lack any b...

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Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism

Cited by 6 publications

References 19 publications

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Epistemic Duties

Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification

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