The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable (ethical conservativism) seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview (ethical naturalism). Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism.Many of us desire a meta-ethical position that allows us to take ordinary ethical discourse seriously. It seems to those of us, that is, that much of what we say about right and wrong or good and bad, for example, is true. Even more, it seems to those of us that we typically know many of these truths. What many of us desire, in other words, is a meta-ethical position that sees our ordinary ethical discourse as tracking important features of an accessible reality, as opposed to seeing it as some kind of mistake, mystery, or fiction (however useful). As we will put it, this is a desire for conservativism about ethical discourse, or ethical conservativism for short.Many of us, just as much, desire a meta-ethical position that respects the success of scientific inquiry. It seems to those of us, that is, that certain scientific explanations are the most impressive and secure examples of knowledge of the world around us, and that we are thereby required to conform our methods of inquiry and the ontological commitments of our theories to its methods and commitments. Put a bit differently, it seems that the correct scientific account of the world has a special kind of privilege: the methods it deploys, and the entities that it requires-which we will hereafter refer to as natural -are the ones that we have most reason to employ and believe exist. What those of us desire, then, is a meta-ethical position that does not commit us to non-scientific (non-natural) methods and entities. As we will put * We are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and discussion.

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Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Deontological Evidentialism (DE) is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Brogaard's (2014) use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford's moral defense of (DE). I then use this very distinction against a defense of (DE) inspired by Stephen Grimm's (2009)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S's beliefs in accordance with S's evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument's premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism.