Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can

Oliveira, Luis R. G.

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0972-8

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 41 publications

(16 reference statements)

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“…I won't pursue that line of argument here, but see Perrine (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of the doxastic puzzle and matters of responsibility. 17 I have argued elsewhere against versions of evidentialism stated in terms of prescriptive ought-claims (Oliveira 2017(Oliveira , 2018a, and against internalist notions of justification stated in agential terms (Oliveira 2015(Oliveira , 2018b).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Oliveira¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Oliveira¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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“…I won't pursue that line of argument here, but see Perrine (forthcoming) for a recent discussion of the doxastic puzzle and matters of responsibility. I have argued elsewhere against versions of evidentialism stated in terms of prescriptive ought-claims (Oliveira 2017(Oliveira , 2018a, and against internalist notions of justification stated in agential terms (Oliveira 2015(Oliveira , 2018b.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Duties

McCain¹,

Stapleford²

2020

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There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

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“…However, I have criticized that principle elsewhere (Perrine (Forthcoming)) and will not examine it here again. (For additional discussion of A Evidence Principle, see DeRose (2000), Aikin (2006), Shaffer (2013), McCormick (2015), Oliveira (2018). )…”

Section: Feldman's Defense Of His Key Premisesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth

Perrine

2019

Acta Anal

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Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman's criticisms. I'll argue that Feldman's arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. In fact, one of the main problems in value epistemology is to determine whether the final epistemic value of true beliefs can account for the value of other things standardly deemed to be of epistemic value like knowledge or understanding. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman's criticisms. I'll argue that Feldman's arguments ultimate turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.I. Feldman's Main Arguments Our topic is final epistemic value. By 'final value' I have in mind something that is valuable in and of itself or for its own sake. (Other authors use other terms like 'intrinsic goodness' or 'final goodness' to denote the same thing.) The qualifier 'epistemic' is meant to denote that we are concerned with a specific kind or species of final value. What exactly separates final epistemic value from other kinds of final value is a difficult topic. I will not discuss it here except to say that it is commonly assumed that there is such a difference.An important dispute in epistemology is what exactly is of final epistemic value. In a couple of papers (2000, 2002), Richard Feldman offers a (partial) theory of final epistemic value. In so doing, he criticizes two theses. The first is this:Necessary Thesis: A doxastic attitude has some final epistemic value only if it is true. The second is this:Sufficiency Thesis: If a doxastic attitude is true, then it has some final epistemic value. (By 'doxastic attitudes,' we have in mind beliefs, disbeliefs, and suspended beliefs/withholdings.)Several comments about these principles. First, they refer to when a doxastic attitude "has some" final epistemic value. I will interpret this phrase to be neutral as to the overall final epistemic value of a doxastic attitude. On this usage, it is consistent to hold that a doxastic attitude has some final epistemic value but the total final epistemic value of that attitude is negative. If there are other things of final epistemic value-other things that might "confer" or "detract" epistemic value from doxastic attitudes-then perhaps the total final epistemic value of doxastic attitudes is not determined solely by the truth of such attitudes.

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Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can

Cited by 5 publications

References 41 publications

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity

Epistemic Duties

Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth

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