An adaptation of the “general inquirer” for the systematic analysis of political documents

Holsti, Ole R.

doi:10.1002/bs.3830090412

Cited by 18 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…In research on decision making during international conflicts it has been posited that a threat to security results in a restriction of the number of alternatives considered by policy makers (Snyder and Paige, 1958;North et al, 1963;Holsti, 1964). The reason fora restriction in alternatives is not yet clear.…”

Section: The Effect Of Threat Upon Informational Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This reduction in search could have been due to the overloading of communication channels that often occurs at Threat-Rigidity Effects the onset of threat. Holsti (1964), for example, found evidence of information overload in the crisis preceding World War 1. The central decision units were physically overloaded, and, hence, information search attempts were blocked.…”

Section: The Effect Of Threat Upon Informational Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis

Staw¹,

Sandelands²,

Dutton³

1981

Administrative Science Quarterly

2,939

2,228

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ler, and the anonymousASQ reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. This paper explores the case for a general threat-rigidity effect in individual, group, and organizational behavior. Evidence from multiple levels of analysis is summarized, showing a restriction in information processing and constriction of control under threat conditions. Possible mechanisms underlying such a multiple-level effect are explored, as are its possible functional and dysfunctional consequences. Recent economic trends have engendered interest in how organizations cope with adversity. Some researchers have taken an evolutionary perspective on this issue, examining the life span of a large number of organizations under varying environmental conditions (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979). Others have taken a more policy-oriented perspective, examining how specific organizations have successfully or unsuccessfully adapted to threatening environments (Argenti, 1976; Rubin, 1977; Starbuck and Hedberg, 1977). This paper will also address the question of organizational adaptation in the face of adversity. However, rather than simply concentrating upon organizational actions in a social or market context, we will focus upon how adversity affects the adaptability of multiple layers of an organizational system. At present, sociological theory notes that organizations attempt to cope with potential sources of adversity (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) by adjusting their internal structure or by taking actions to enhance their position in the environment. Many of these market strategies and buffering techniques (e.g., Thompson, 1967) have a rather anthropomorphic quality to them and could be construed as the product of a policy-making group or even a single decision maker. While it can be argued that sociological rather than psychological theories are best equipped to explain macro-level phenomena, there are, as Miller (1978) has noted, many effects that appear to generalize across levels of analysis. The reaction of entities to threat or adversity may be just such a phenomenon. The anthropomorphic quality of macro-level propositions may be the product of parallels in the effect of threat upon individual, group, and organizational behavior. Anthropomorphism may also result from the fact that organizational actions are often initiated by individual and group forces, such that social and psychological effects indirectly influence organization-level phenomena. Not only do current models emphasize organizational and not individual or group responses to adversity, but they also take a functional stance. It is commonly assumed that methods of coping with adversity are appropriate and increase the survival prospects of the organization (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1 978) or protect local interests (Cyert and March, 1963). What is missing is the identification of maladaptive or pathological cycles of behavior (Merton, 1967; Hall, 1976). This article will therefore examine evidence for a...

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Section: The Effect Of Threat Upon Informational Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Effect Of Threat Upon Informational Processesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis

Staw¹,

Sandelands²,

Dutton³

1981

Administrative Science Quarterly

2,939

2,228

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…NOTES A good frame of reference for studying international conflict as well as communication is offered by the "Stanford Interaction Model", see. Holsti, 1964. For instance, Holsti's study cited above; Buchanan and C a n t d , 1964; and Charles…”

Section: Summary and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

American and Finnish Journalists Look at World Leaders*

Nordenstreng¹

1968

Scand Pol Stud

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This study was initiated when the author was research fellow at Southern Illinois University in fall 1966, and the American material was gathered during the author's tour of USA carried out with support fromtheFinnish Broadcasting Company in spring 1967. The author is grateful to Drs. James Lernert, Bruce Rucker and Erkki Teikari for their help and criticism in the planning of this study. Special gratitude is addressed to the 34 foreign editon who were kind enough to give their busy time for this study.

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“…The actual operation of this version of the General Inquirer has been discussed elsewhere (Holsti, 1969(Holsti, , 1964. For our purpose it is sufficient to note that the system is capable of generating data that will allow measurements along the above-mentioned dimensions.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evaluation of self, allies, and enemies in the 1956 Suez Crisis

Siverson

1972

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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An adaptation of the “general inquirer” for the systematic analysis of political documents

Cited by 18 publications

References 4 publications

Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis

Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis

American and Finnish Journalists Look at World Leaders*

The evaluation of self, allies, and enemies in the 1956 Suez Crisis

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