An Adaptive Connectionist Model of Cognitive Dissonance

Abstract

This article proposes an adaptive connectionist model that implements an attributional account of cognitive dissonance. The model represents an attitude as the connection between the attitude object and behavioral-affective outcomes. Dissonance arises when circumstantial constraints induce a mismatch between the model's (mental) prediction and discrepant behavior or affect. Reduction of dissonance by attitude change is accomplished through long-lasting changes in the connection weights using the error-correcting delta learning algorithm. The model can explain both the typical effects predicted by dissonance theory as well as some atypical effects (i.e., reinforcement effect), using this principle of weight changes and by giving a prominent role to affective experiences. The model was implemented in a standard feedforward connectionist network. Computer simulations showed an adequate fit with several classical dissonance paradigms (inhibition, initiation, forced compliance, free choice, & misattribution), as well as novel studies that underscore the role of affect. A comparison with an earlier constraint satisfaction approach (Shultz & Lepper, 1996) indicates that the feedforward implementation provides a similar fit with these shortcomings of this previous model.More than 40 years ago, Festinger (1957) developed a theory of cognitive dissonance that became one of the most influential models in social psychology (Jones, 1985). Cognitive dissonance arises when there are inconsistencies between cognitions or elements ofknowledge that people have about oneself, one's behavior, or the environment. This cognitive inconsistency generates psychological discomfort that motivates people to reduce it, for instance, by changing their beliefs, attitudes, or behavior. After Festinger's original formulation, numerous revisions or alternatives to cognitive dissonance theory have been advanced (see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Some revisions, like self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) and the attributional reformulation (Cooper & Fazio, 1984) propose that dissonance reduction is driven by people's attributions for their discrepant behavior and the situation in which it occurs. When no situational attribution can be made, people assume that their behavior reflects their true attitude. As a result, they change their attitude to attain consistency between their behavior and their attitude. Other, more recent revisions like self-consistency theory (e.g., Aronson, 1968) and self-affirmation theory (e.g., Steele, 1988) focus on the central role of the self in the cognitive dissonance process (see also Stone & Cooper, 2001). We are grateful to Dirk Van Rooy and Christophe Labiouse for their helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this article. Requests for reprints should be sent to Frank Van Overwalle, Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 BrusselBelgium. E-mail: Frank.VanOverwalle@vub.ac.be human data, while avoiding a number of Recently, a number of computational models have been formulated to acco...

Talking nets: A multiagent connectionist approach to communication and trust between individuals.

“…First, we want to emphasize the theoretical similarities that underlie the simulations of these diverse social phenomena with the present findings of communication and the emergence of collective judgments and stereotypes. Second, this model is capable to reproduce a wider range of social cognitive phenomena and is computationally more powerful than other connectionist models that represent an individual agent's mental processing, like feedforward networks (Van Overwalle & Jordens, 2002; see or constraint satisfaction models Siebler, 2002; for a critique see Van Overwalle, 1998).…”

Cognitive Dissonance and Affect: An Initial Test of a Connectionist Account

“…The model of cognitive dissonance developed by Van Overwalle and Jordens (2002) adopts not only the three-component view on attitudes as consisting of beliefs, evaluations and behavioural tendencies (Katz & Stotland, 1959;Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960), it also incorporates earlier attributional accounts of cognitive dissonance (Cooper & Fazio, 1984). It concurs with Cooper and Fazio's (1984) attributional model that people's attempts causally to understand and justify their dissonant behaviour and emotions are at the root of the creation and reduction of dissonance arousal.…”

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In their connectionist model of cognitive dissonance, Van Overwalle & Jordens (2002) put forward the hypothesis that positive affect increases behaviour-induced attitudes, while negative affect decreases attitudes. In this article, this hypothesised role of affect was tested for two well-known paradigms in the cognitive dissonance literature: free choice and induced compliance.

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“…Most recently, Van Overwalle and Jordens (2002) proposed an adaptive connectionist model of dissonance that implemented a great deal of Cooper and Fazio's (1984) attributional perspective, but provided a more independent role for negative affective experiences. This connectionist model presents a major improvement over an earlier connectionist constraint-satisfaction model (Shultz & Lepper, 1996) that did not allow for learning and permanent attitude changes.…”

“…An important advancement of the connectionist model by Van Overwalle and Jordens (2002) is its integration of the dissonance and reinforcement effects by assuming a more crucial role of affect in producing the reinforcement effect. Before describing this integration in more detail, we will first present the basic features of the connectionist model and then discuss the connectionist implementation of the concept of cognitive dissonance.…”