This article proposes an adaptive connectionist model that implements an attributional account of cognitive dissonance. The model represents an attitude as the connection between the attitude object and behavioral-affective outcomes. Dissonance arises when circumstantial constraints induce a mismatch between the model's (mental) prediction and discrepant behavior or affect. Reduction of dissonance by attitude change is accomplished through long-lasting changes in the connection weights using the error-correcting delta learning algorithm. The model can explain both the typical effects predicted by dissonance theory as well as some atypical effects (i.e., reinforcement effect), using this principle of weight changes and by giving a prominent role to affective experiences. The model was implemented in a standard feedforward connectionist network. Computer simulations showed an adequate fit with several classical dissonance paradigms (inhibition, initiation, forced compliance, free choice, & misattribution), as well as novel studies that underscore the role of affect. A comparison with an earlier constraint satisfaction approach (Shultz & Lepper, 1996) indicates that the feedforward implementation provides a similar fit with these shortcomings of this previous model.More than 40 years ago, Festinger (1957) developed a theory of cognitive dissonance that became one of the most influential models in social psychology (Jones, 1985). Cognitive dissonance arises when there are inconsistencies between cognitions or elements ofknowledge that people have about oneself, one's behavior, or the environment. This cognitive inconsistency generates psychological discomfort that motivates people to reduce it, for instance, by changing their beliefs, attitudes, or behavior. After Festinger's original formulation, numerous revisions or alternatives to cognitive dissonance theory have been advanced (see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Some revisions, like self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) and the attributional reformulation (Cooper & Fazio, 1984) propose that dissonance reduction is driven by people's attributions for their discrepant behavior and the situation in which it occurs. When no situational attribution can be made, people assume that their behavior reflects their true attitude. As a result, they change their attitude to attain consistency between their behavior and their attitude. Other, more recent revisions like self-consistency theory (e.g., Aronson, 1968) and self-affirmation theory (e.g., Steele, 1988) focus on the central role of the self in the cognitive dissonance process (see also Stone & Cooper, 2001). We are grateful to Dirk Van Rooy and Christophe Labiouse for their helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this article. Requests for reprints should be sent to Frank Van Overwalle, Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 BrusselBelgium. E-mail: Frank.VanOverwalle@vub.ac.be human data, while avoiding a number of Recently, a number of computational models have been formulated to acco...

In their connectionist model of cognitive dissonance, Van Overwalle & Jordens (2002) put forward the hypothesis that positive affect increases behaviour-induced attitudes, while negative affect decreases attitudes. In this article, this hypothesised role of affect was tested for two well-known paradigms in the cognitive dissonance literature: free choice and induced compliance. For the free-choice paradigm, we replicated the findings in the difficult-high choice condition of Shultz, Léveillé and Lepper (1999) and additionally induced negative mood. As predicted, negative mood resulted in a more negative attitude compared to no mood induction. For the induced compliance paradigm, we replicated the Linder, Cooper & Jones (1967) dissonance and reinforcement findings and additionally induced opposite mood in the no-choice (reinforcement) conditions. Specifically, we induced positive mood in the low reward condition and negative mood in the high reward condition. Again as predicted, positive mood increased the attitude and negative mood decreased the attitude, resulting in an elimination of the reinforcement effect. Festinger (1957) defined cognitive dissonance as an aversive state produced by inconsistent cognitions that people have about oneself, others or the environment. The tension or arousal produced by this cognitive discrepancy motivates people to reduce dissonance through behavioural change or cognitive restructuring such as attitude change. Several revisions and advancements of cognitive dissonance theory proposed during the last decades emphasised different affective aspects of this dissonant arousal state (for an overview, see Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). One of these theoretical revisions, inspired by the self-perception theory of Bem (1967), was the attributional account proposed by Cooper and Fazio (1984). They suggested that the causal interpretation of the discrepant behaviour motivates dissonance reduction. If a person makes an internal attribution for the aversive consequences of the behaviour, then dissonance arousal will motivate attitude change.