An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics

Abstract

of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Personhood and a meaningful life in African philosophy

“…Scholars of the discourse of personhood in African philosophy usually point to the ambiguity and confusion surrounding this term in the literature (see Wiredu 1996;Oyowe 2014;Ikuenobe 2016;Molefe 2019a). Kwasi Wiredu identifies two distinct concepts of personhood: the ontological and normative (1996; 2009).…”

“…The achievement associated with personhood essentially has to do with the moral agent nurturing or developing "one's distinctively human and valuable nature" qua the capacity for virtue (Metz 2007, 31). Scholars account for the achievement of personhood in terms of nurturing a virtuous character or moral excellence (Ikuenobe 2006;Molefe 2019a).…”

“…Space does not quite allow me to motivate and justify why we should take seriously the moral vision of personhood. In several places, I have proffered justifications of personhood as a moral theory (see Molefe 2018;2019a;2020a).…”

“…The major moral-theoretical challenge occasioned by espousing a moderate perfectionist moral view which balances the pursuit of moral perfection and cultural dimensions of human existence is how to justify it. I will not offer an exhaustive justification of it here, but I want to suggest that in African thought, morality is understood to be of a limited kind, or at least, plausible interpretations of it (see Wiredu 1992;Molefe 2019a). It is the view that morality is of a limited nature, in terms of the scope of the demands that it places on us, in the discourse of personhood qua the pursuit of moral perfection that accommodates the cultural dimensions of human existence.…”

“…Secondly, the limits associated with the goal of moral perfection emerge in light of the fact of the prize placed on special relationships in the communitarian ethics characteristic of personhood (see Wiredu 1992;Appiah 1998;Molefe 2016;2019a). The suggestion here is that one should pursue moral perfection in ways that will foster participation in one's special relationships by faithfully executing one's special obligations to them.…”