2009
DOI: 10.4102/sajbm.v40i2.537
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An analysis of corporate board networks in South Africa

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the networks created from directors sitting on the boards of companies in South Africa. We consider two projections of this network: a director network, in which only directors are present and two directors are linked if they sit together on one or more common boards; and a firm network, in which only firms are present and an edge indicates that the two firms share one or more directors. We describe these networks in terms of the statistical properties that they possess, and compare th… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Based on literature focusing on the measurement of direct networks, these degree calculations can be used to assess managerial or power influences (Bonacich, 1987; Brass, 2011; Horton & Serafeim, 2012; Renneboog & Zhao, 2011). Both calculations ( DEGREE-IN and DEGREE-EX ) represent network size and connectivity (Durbach & Parker, 2009; Fracassi, 2017).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Based on literature focusing on the measurement of direct networks, these degree calculations can be used to assess managerial or power influences (Bonacich, 1987; Brass, 2011; Horton & Serafeim, 2012; Renneboog & Zhao, 2011). Both calculations ( DEGREE-IN and DEGREE-EX ) represent network size and connectivity (Durbach & Parker, 2009; Fracassi, 2017).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Commentators have argued for and against whether the NEDs provide effective monitoring and promote firm value. Durbach and Parker (2009), Bozec (2005) and Gupta and Fields (2009) argue that it is not always the NEDs that act independently; at times, they have significant conflict of interest due to relationships and connections with inside executives and thereby compromise their independence. When the independence is affected, these directors lose their monitoring effectiveness and this can lead to a decrease in company value.…”
Section: Percentage Of Non-executive Directorsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When central actors persist in perceiving and selecting certain patterns, they tend to ignore information with potentially greater adaptive value. The social construction of dynamic capabilities is, therefore, constrained by the perceptual framings that signal opportunities and threats, as when CEOs of poorly performing firms seek advice from their network of close friends rather than from individuals at the periphery of their network (McDonald & Westphal, 2003;Durbach & Parker, 2009). The study of how discrepancies between potential and realized competitive advantage are created and resolved is a fruitful but underexplored area in the literature on dynamic capabilities.…”
Section: Micro-foundationsmentioning
confidence: 99%