An Anti-Reductionist Account of Singular Causation

Rota, Michael

doi:10.5840/monist20099217

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…McDaniel considers three species of minimal primitivism concerning grounding, differentiated by the senses of reduction they involve (2017: 225–26). And Rota defines primitive (or basic) facts as ‘facts that are not reducible to other facts’ (2009: 135).…”

Section: What Are Reductionism and Primitivism Anyway?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The AAA is used pervasively in the causation literature, where one main argument for causal primitivism comes from our persistent failure to analyze causal connections in noncausal terms (c.f. Schaffer 2008: 86–89; Rota 2009: 133–34). It appears in the literature on intrinsicality, discussed in detail by Alexander Skiles (2014: 234–37).…”

Section: The Argument From Absence Of Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction

Bertrand¹

2019

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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The argument from absence of analysis (AAA) infers primitivism about some x from the absence of a reductive analysis of x. But philosophers use the word ‘primitive’ to mean many distinct things. I argue that there is a robust sense of ‘primitive’ present in the metaphysics literature that cannot be inferred via the AAA. Successfully demonstrating robust primitivism about some x requires showing two things at once: that a reduction of x is not possible and that an explanatorily deep characterization of x is not available. In order to secure this second explanatory claim, the AAA must wrongly assume that reductive analysis is our only source of explanatory characterization. I argue that this is false by offering a distinct way of providing explanatory characterizations backed by suitably understood metaphysical constraints. While there remains a minimal sense of ‘primitive’ inferable via the AAA, this sense is exhausted by the denial of reduction. With minimal primitivism as its target, the AAA is uninteresting.

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Section: What Are Reductionism and Primitivism Anyway?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Argument From Absence Of Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction

Bertrand¹

2019

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…The idea of such a 'brute' causal connection does regularly surface in the contemporary anti-Humean discourse, such as when it is claimed that causation is a 'primitive' relation. See, e.g.,Rota [2009] and Schaffer[2016]. It also plays a prominent role within so-called 'singularist' conceptions of causality: see, e.g.,Whittle [2003].9 What about the Fregean route of asserting concepts to be mind-independent entities of some sort, which may then be identified with the universals?…”

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confidence: 99%

Absolute Idealist Powers

Mulder

2021

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Although contemporary powers metaphysics largely understands itself as a metaphysical realist undertaking, recently powers have come to the surface also within an idealist context. This paper aims to characterize and motivate an absolute idealist conception of powers. I compare realist and idealist powers metaphysics in their respective responses to Humean scepticism concerning powers, thereby motivating the claim that the very idea of a power is actually best understood as an idealist idea. I continue to characterize the absolute idealist's understanding of power, for which it is necessary to see that the content of her power notion is inseparable from the way in which she arrives at that notion. I close with a brief reflection on the absolute idealist's understanding of the power of thought, which is where idealist and realist powers metaphysics diverge most radically.

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Causation, Dispositions, and Physical Occasionalism

Schultz¹,

D'Andrea-Winslow²

2017

Zygon

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Even though theistic philosophers and scientists agree that God created, sustains, and providentially governs the physical universe and even though much has been published in general regarding divine action, what is needed is a fine‐grained, conceptually coherent account of divine action, causation, dispositions, and laws of nature consistent with divine aseity, satisfying the widely recognized adequacy conditions for any account of dispositions.1 Such an account would be a basic part of a more comprehensive theory of divine action in relation to the fundamental concepts of science and of mathematics. Our aim in this article is simply to present such a theory.

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An Anti-Reductionist Account of Singular Causation

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction

Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction

Absolute Idealist Powers

Causation, Dispositions, and Physical Occasionalism

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