An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence

Haddock, David D.; Curran, Christopher

doi:10.1086/467765

Cited by 84 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…Unfortunately, this result is only valid under very limiting conditions; the courts and both parties must have full and costless information. When information is costly to obtain and, hence, incomplete, tort law does not necessarily result in optimal deterrence (Cooter and Ulen, 1986;Haddock and Curran, 1985;Kolstad, Ulen, and Johnson, 1990;Shavell, 1987;and White 1989).…”

Section: The Theory Of Medical Malpracticementioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation of medical professions

Olsen¹

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Section: The Theory Of Medical Malpracticementioning

confidence: 99%

Regulation of medical professions

Olsen¹

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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“…The injurer is therefore liable unless he can prove that he has exercised due care. We now continue our analysis by introducing, discussing, and comparing several forms of the negligence rule (see for example Wittmann, 1986;Haddock and Curran, 1985). Let us begin with the simplest form of negligence.…”

Section: Negligencementioning

confidence: 99%

Strict Liability Versus Negligence

Mueller‐Langer

Schäfer

2008

SSRN Journal

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The purpose of this chapter is to compare negligence rules and strict liability rules and to examine the allocative effects resulting from the application of different liability regimes. It first discusses unilateral accidents, while the more complicated bilateral cases follow afterwards. Each section starts with a discussion of the rule of no liability before moving on to various forms of negligence and ending with various strict liability rules. At the end of each section, there is a discussion on how results change when relaxing specific assumptions. The various aspects are summarised focusing on the question of whether the outcome under a specific liability regime is efficient or not. We also discuss a few more specific topics of interest, for example, the allocative effects of various liability rules when agents enter into a contractual relationship, cases of 'joint liability', the impact of uncertain legal standards, and the interaction between liability law and insurance. JEL classification: K0

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“…The literature has moved in the direction of relaxing some of the standard assumptions. Comparative negligence seems to improve incentives when judges make random errors in comparing the due level of care to the level of care actually taken by the parties (evidentiary uncertainty, Cooter and Ulen, 1986) when the standard of care is uniform for all parties but the individual costs of care differ (Rubinfeld, 1987), and when judges err regarding the level of care cost actually borne by parties (Haddock and Curran, 1985 Craswell (1984), Craswell and Calfee (1986), Diamond (1974).…”

Section: A Guided Tour Throughout the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Tort Law: A Precis

Mattiacci

Parisi

2003

SSRN Journal

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Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics

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An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence

Cited by 84 publications

References 0 publications

Regulation of medical professions

Regulation of medical professions

Strict Liability Versus Negligence

The Economics of Tort Law: A Precis

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