An efficient authentication and key agreement protocol for 4G (LTE) networks

Alezabi, Kamal Ali; Hashim, Fazirulhisyam; Hashim, Shaiful Jahari; Ali, Borhanuddin Mohd

doi:10.1109/tenconspring.2014.6863085

Cited by 42 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The EPC framework includes LTE radio base stations (eNB) [31,47] that connect to the control plane components such as > TII-17-2276 < 4 MME, User Plane Gateways such as Packet Data Network Gateway (PDN-GW) & Serving GW (SGW). The MME acts as a Key Distributor (KD) [3][4][5][6][7][8][9] in the LTE. The EPS network holds both MME and SAE [1,2] and connects these two to the E-UTRAN entities over the many-to-many interface via HSS.…”

Section: The Lte Architecture With Ipg-akamentioning

confidence: 99%

A Console GRID Leveraged Authentication and Key Agreement Mechanism for LTE/SAE

Arul

Raja

Chaudry

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Ind. Inf.

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 Abstract-Growing popularity of multimedia applications, pervasive connectivity, higher bandwidth, and euphoric technology penetration among bulk of the human race that happens to be cellular technology users, has fueled the adaptation to Long Term Evolution (LTE)/ System Architecture Evolution (SAE). The LTE fulfills the resource demands of the next generation applications for now. We identify security issues in authentication mechanism used in LTE that without countermeasures might give super user rights to unauthorized users. The LTE uses static LTE Key (LTE-K) to derive the entire key hierarchy, i.e., LTE follows Evolved Packet System -Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) based authentication, which discloses user identity, location, and other Personally Identifiable Information (PII). To counter this, we propose a public key cryptosystem named "International mobile subscriber identity Protected Console Grid based Authentication and Key Agreement (IPG-AKA) protocol" to address the vulnerabilities related to weak key management. From the data obtained from threat modeling and simulation results, we claim that the IPG-AKA scheme not only improves security of authentication procedures, it also shows improvements in authentication loads and reduction in key generation time. The empirical results and qualitative analysis presented in this paper proves that IPG-AKA improves security in authentication procedure and performance in the LTE.

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Section: The Lte Architecture With Ipg-akamentioning

confidence: 99%

A Console GRID Leveraged Authentication and Key Agreement Mechanism for LTE/SAE

Arul

Raja

Chaudry

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Ind. Inf.

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“…Efficient EPS-AKA (EEPS-AKA) was proposed to deal with the issue of user identity disclosure [4]. In EEPS-AKA, Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)-SPEKE is based on password shared only between peer and authenticator.…”

Section: Analysis Of Eeps-akamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The EEPS-AKA focuses on the protection of user identity rather than preventing DoS attacks, which can be launched with legitimate UEs. However, the detailed efficiency evaluation and simulation is not performed for EEPS-AKA in [4].…”

Section: Flaws In the Eeps-akamentioning

confidence: 99%

Temporary Internet Access for Authentication and Key Agreement for LTE Networks

Xie

2018

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Evolved Packet System-Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) is the security protocol in Long-Term Evolution (LTE). However, it is still vulnerable to user identity attacks and fake eNBs. Efficient EPS-AKA (EEPS-AKA) was proposed with some improvements. Nevertheless, the EEPS-AKA is vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and fake eNBs, despite of some minor flaws in its procedures. In this paper, we propose Temporary Internet Access (TIA)-AKA to: (1) prevent user identity disclosure by implementing some additional steps, which allows a user equipment (UE) to request a temporary UE identity to access Internet; and (2) authenticate the Mobility Management Entity (MME) through the validity of the assigned IP address. Physical address and simple password exponential key exchange (SPEKE) method are combined into the proposed TIA-AKA. Efficiency analysis suggests the TIA-AKA provides a fully protection on the user identity and prevent the DoS attack, at the expense of increased bandwidth consumption and processing delay.

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“…Alezabi et al applied Diffie‐Hellman keys to improve the identity protection and session key forward secrecy, but each authentication needs the involvement of HN; it incurs unbearable communication overhead.…”

Section: Umts‐aka and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These 2 approaches inevitably incur high computational load on clients and the heavy communication overhead issue is not addressed. Alezabi et al 16 applied Diffie-Hellman keys to improve the identity protection and session key forward secrecy, but each authentication needs the involvement of HN; it incurs unbearable communication overhead.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An effective approach to solving large communication overhead issue and strengthening the securities of AKA protocols

Chien

2017

Int J Communication

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SummaryAuthentication and key agreement (AKA) is a challenge-response-like security protocol that uses symmetric-key cryptography to establish authenticated keys between 2 parties. Its application in the third-generation mobile system universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) is called UMTS-AKA, and the version applied in the fourth-generation mobile communication system long-term evolution (LTE) is called LTE-AKA. Both UMTS-AKA and LTE-AKA share the same weakness: the network operators need to maintain a large space of authentication vectors for visiting stations, and the transmission of the vectors causes lots of overhead. This weakness will be amplified when there are billions of devices accessing the network in the Internet-of-things scenarios. In addition, these schemes provide only key distribution (not key agreement) and cannot provide session key forward secrecy. In this paper, we propose a range-bound key assignment technique to tackle the challenges. The proposed scheme drastically reduces the communication overhead and greatly strengthens the security robustness. The securities are analyzed and are verified using the AVISPA toolset. | INTRODUCTIONIn the mobile networks such as universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) and long-term evolution (LTE), a mobile station (MS) need to establish authenticated keys with the current serving network (SN) via the help of the station's home network (HN). 1-3 The authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol is one of the most popular authentication protocols adopted in mobile networks. AKA is a challenge-response-like (we will elaborate on this in Section 2) protocol that applies symmetric-key cryptography to establish authenticated keys between 2 parties. Initially, an MS and its HN share some secret keys. When an MS visits an SN, it launches a service request upon which the SN forwards the request to the HN, and the HN returns some authentication vectors (AVs) for the SN to share authenticated session keys with the MS. The long latency between an SN and an HN could incur unbearable communication burden on the authentication process; therefore, the core of both UMTS-AKA 1 and LTE-AKA 2 is to reduce the number of interactions between an SN and an HN. This is achieved by delivering a list of AVs when an SN forwards a request to an HN. Each vector in an AV list consists of (XSQN, RAND, AUTH, XRES, and keying materials) for the SN and the MS to authenticate each other and to derive the same session keys (keying materials). XSQN is an encrypted form of the MS's sequence number (SQN). RAND acts a challenge from the HN. AUTH acts as the HN's response to the MS's request. XRES is the expected response from the MS. Because the HN is not directly involved in the authentication process, the SQN is checked by the MS to ensure the freshness of the corresponding AUTH. This

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An efficient authentication and key agreement protocol for 4G (LTE) networks

Cited by 42 publications

References 10 publications

A Console GRID Leveraged Authentication and Key Agreement Mechanism for LTE/SAE

A Console GRID Leveraged Authentication and Key Agreement Mechanism for LTE/SAE

Temporary Internet Access for Authentication and Key Agreement for LTE Networks

An effective approach to solving large communication overhead issue and strengthening the securities of AKA protocols

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