Why do we sometimes opt for actions or items that we do not value the most? Under current neurocomputational theories, such preference reversals are typically interpreted in terms of errors that arise from the unreliable signaling of value to brain decision systems. But, an alternative explanation is that people may change their mind because they are reassessing the value of alternative options while pondering the decision. So, why do we carefully ponder some decisions, but not others? In this work, we derive a computational model of the metacognitive control of decisions or MCD. In brief, we assume that the amount of cognitive resources that is deployed during a decision is controlled by an effort-confidence tradeoff. Importantly, the anticipated benefit of allocating resources varies in a decision-by-decision manner according to decision difficulty and importance. The ensuing MCD model predicts choices, decision time, subjective feeling of effort, choice confidence, and choice-induced preference change. As we will see, these predictions are critically different from accumulation-tobound models of value-based decisions. We compare and test these predictions in a systematic manner, using a dedicated behavioral paradigm. Our results provides a mechanistic link between mental effort, choice confidence, and preference reversals, which suggests alternative interpretations of existing related neuroimaging findings.