1986
DOI: 10.1086/292815
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An Epistemic Conception of Democracy

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Cited by 419 publications
(177 citation statements)
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“…En lugar de la equidad de las condiciones ideales, el asunto se torna en la confiabilidad de un procedimiento (dados algunos estándares independientes). Este tipo de estándar es presupuesto por el teorema de Condorcet tal y como se ha utilizado para defender la democracia deliberativa (Cohen, 1986;Estlund, 1993b). El problema estriba en que este estándar de objetividad no es necesariamente operativo en la deliberación misma.…”
Section: Justificación Política Y Antinomias De La Razón Pú-blicaunclassified
“…En lugar de la equidad de las condiciones ideales, el asunto se torna en la confiabilidad de un procedimiento (dados algunos estándares independientes). Este tipo de estándar es presupuesto por el teorema de Condorcet tal y como se ha utilizado para defender la democracia deliberativa (Cohen, 1986;Estlund, 1993b). El problema estriba en que este estándar de objetividad no es necesariamente operativo en la deliberación misma.…”
Section: Justificación Política Y Antinomias De La Razón Pú-blicaunclassified
“…But understanding why they are misplaced can itself add to the legitimacy of a decision (Mill 1991(Mill [1861, 282). It can help people to see more clearly why the decision went one way rather than another, and hence increase their confidence in the epistemic merits of the decision (Cohen 1986;Estlund 2007;Luskin et al 2014). …”
Section: Why Take a Deliberative Approach?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the deliberative democracy, political decisions are to be made through a collective procedure of argumentation where arguing consists in exchanging reasons, oriented to the goal of rationally convincing others, instead of strategic participation oriented to impose personal political preferences or desires on others (Manin, 1987 ; and it is supposed to lead us, at least ideally, to rational consensus.Deliberation assumes, as we have seen, both the existence of rightness (or impartiality, or some other equivalent) in political decisions, and the possibility to know which is the right (or impartial) decision (Cohen, 1986, Estlund, 1997: 174; Christiano, 1997).…”
Section: The Assumptions Of Deliberationmentioning
confidence: 99%