An examination of executive compensation in the restaurant industry

Guillet, Basak Denizci; Küçükusta, Deniz; Xiao, Qu

doi:10.1016/j.ijhm.2011.04.014

Cited by 32 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 78 publications

(139 reference statements)

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“…With regards to accounting performance, negative coefficient on the interaction term Roa*Risk does not comply with the traditional practice of rewarding executives for improved firm performance. It has been previously shown that restaurant firms reward their executives for increased firm performance (Madanoglu and Karadag, 2006;Guillet et al, 2012). Punishing executives for improved firm performance in a riskier restaurant firm could basically be viewed as an anomaly unless the board of directors views the riskiness of a restaurant firm as totally irrelevant to its performance.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dalbor et al (2010) examine the restaurant industry and provide evidence of a market performance effect on the CEO's total compensation. In a more recent study, Guillet et al (2012) examine the executive compensation in the restaurant industry and report varying results for CEO, senior executive officers and board members. According to their study, firm size and tenure appeared to be common determinants of executive compensation in the restaurant industry.…”

Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry

Özdemir

Kizildag

Upneja

2013

International Journal of Hospitality Management

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a b s t r a c tThe structure of compensation packages of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been a significant research interest for researchers across various disciplines. In this paper, we examine a unique relationship between CEO compensation and risk (systematic risk) in the US restaurant industry. Our research question stems from the assumption that CEOs must be rewarded with a higher incentive-based compensation in high-risk profile restaurant companies in order to motivate them to perform in their full potential for mutual benefits of the CEO and shareowners. Furthermore, we investigate whether firm risk moderates the relationship between firm performance and CEO total compensation controlling for the firm size and CEO ownership. We draw our sample firms from the US restaurant industry. Findings of our study suggest that firm risk induces a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation for restaurant companies' CEOs, and firm risk does not seem to moderate the relationship between pay and performance in the restaurant industry.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry

Özdemir

Kizildag

Upneja

2013

International Journal of Hospitality Management

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“…When measuring hotel performance, profitability is not just related to financial data such as ROE, ROA), and return on sales. Occupancy rate, room revenue, stock return, productivity, and profit per unit of production have also been widely employed as indicators of business profitability in the hospitality literature (Chen, ; Chen, Hou, & Lee, ; Guillet, Kucukusta, & Xiao, ; Kim & Gu, ; Turner & Guilding, ; Xiao, O'Neill, & Mattila, ). For instance, extant studies claimed that the RevPAR, the TrevPAR, the GOPPAR, the average daily rate, the percentage of occupancy, and the net operating income are used as measurements of hotel performance (Banker, Potter, & Srinivasan, ; Pine & Phillips, ; Mattila & O.Neill, ; O'Neill & Mattila, ; Sainaghi, ).…”

Section: Data Variables and Research Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Occupancy rate, room revenue, stock return, productivity, and profit per unit of production have also been widely employed as indicators of business profitability in the hospitality literature (Chen, 2010;Chen, Hou, & Lee, 2012;Guillet, Kucukusta, & Xiao, 2012;Kim & Gu, 2004;Turner & Guilding, 2011;Xiao, O'Neill, & Mattila, 2012).…”

Section: Performance Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does gender matter for hotel performance? Evidence from the Italian hospitality industry

Menicucci

Paolucci

Paoloni

2019

Journal of Tourism Research

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between gender and profitability in the Italian hospitality industry during the period 2008–2017. The study examines whether female executive managers have any significant effect on the performance of hotel firms. Gender differences result in female underperformance when performance is measured by firm size. Within a bivariate model, findings show few differences when growth and profitability are compared by gender. When a regression model is designed to control other performance determinants (demographic, financial, and family variables), women‐managed hotels outperform those managed by men for hotel growth.

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“…The research examining the executives' compensation on firm performance is still attracted to many scholars (Guillet, Kucukusta and Xiao, 2012;Faria, Martins and Brandão, 2014;Crespi-Cladera and Pascual-Fuster, 2015;Alves, Barbosa and Morais, 2016;Slomka-Golebiowska and Urbanek, 2016). Perhaps, polemics on the argument regarding the executives' compensation needs more research on different condition to confirm the previous results.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Executive’s compensation, good corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm performance: a study of listed banks in Indonesia

Chou¹,

Buchdadi²

2018

JBRMR

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This study aims to examine the relationship between executive's compensation and firm performance in the banking industry in Indonesia. This study also determines the impact of remuneration and nomination committee (RNC) on executive's compensation (EC) and firm performance. The samples are listed bank in Indonesia during 2006-2015. The regression uses two stage least square (2SLS) with unbalanced panel data. The findings reveal that performance on pay and pay on performance are valid in Indonesia. However, the performance is only for accounting-based performance but not for market value-based performance. Furthermore, in examining the role of remuneration and nomination committee (RNC), the findings reveal that the RNC has a negative relationship to the executives' compensation (ES). It seems the role of the RNC is preventing the overpaid of the EC. Finally, regarding the ownership structure, The state banks have the similar behavior with the main findings in this research. However, only in the state bank, the RNC has a real impact on both accounting-based performance and market value-based performance. While ownership concentration (BO) variable which is used as dependent variables in this study reveals the possibility of the agency problems or inactive block holders condition that make ineffective monitoring role of the corporation since the findings show that the more BO, the more EC, and the worse firms performance.

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An examination of executive compensation in the restaurant industry

Cited by 32 publications

References 78 publications

Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry

Does risk matter in CEO compensation contracting? Evidence from US restaurant industry

Does gender matter for hotel performance? Evidence from the Italian hospitality industry

Executive’s compensation, good corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm performance: a study of listed banks in Indonesia

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