An experimental implementation of the kernel/domain architecture

Spier, Michale J.; Hastings, T.; Cutler, David N.

doi:10.1145/957195.808043

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The policy algorithm, however, could never read or write the contents of pages, learn the segment to which each page belonged, or cause one page to overwrite (10) Separation of policy from mechanism is a structural principle that has been explored by many others [21,22,23].…”

Section: Methods Of Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Engineering a security kernel for Multics

Schroeder¹

1975

SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.

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This paper describes a research project to engineer a security kernel for Multics, a general-purpose, remotely accessed, multiuser computer system. The goals are to identify the minimum mechanism that must be correct to guarantee computer enforcement of desired constraints on information access, to simplify the structure of that minimum mechanism to make verification of correctness by auditing possible, and to demonstrate by test implementation that the security kernel so developed is capable of supporting the functionality of Multics completely and efficiently. The paper presents the overall viewpoint and plan for the project and discusses initial strategies being employed to define and structure the security kernel.

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Section: Methods Of Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

Engineering a security kernel for Multics

Schroeder¹

1975

SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.

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“…The architecture can be termed a domain architecture [18], since every procedure is encapsulated within a private memory space. One of the object types in the architecture is the module.…”

Section: The Sward Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

A hardware implementation of capability-based addressing

Myers¹,

Buckingham²

1980

SIGARCH Comput. Archit. News

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The SWARD architecture, an experimental higher-level architecture, contains the naming and protection concept of capability-based addressing. After discussing the merits of capability-based addressing, its general representation in the SWARD architecture is discussed. The initial representation of capability-based addressing in the architecture led to a set of problems; these problems are described, as well as their solutions. Finally, the implementation of capabilities by the processor is discussed.

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An experiment with the interchangeability of processes and monitors

Stroustrup¹

1982

Softw Pract Exp

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Two styles of operating system implementation based on the use of monitors and processes, respectively, are identified, and arguments for a basic equivalence of these systems despite large stylistic differences are presented. The ‘Lauer‐Needham Duality Hypothesis’ states that the two styles are equivalent, both in terms of ease of programming and in efficiency of the resulting systems. A domain for which the first part of this claim holds is outlined, and data affirming the essential equivalence of performance within that domain are presented. An operating system based on the Cambridge CAP system, called SIMOS, was simulated for a wide range of hardware configurations and job loads. SIMOS is written using a module concept that allows an individual module to be interpreted as a monitor in one run and as a process in another. Runs using a monitor to control access to some data can be compared with runs using a process to control access to the same data. The throughput and response time for the two styles of system were found to be identical in most cases. However, a degradation in response time occurred in a process‐based system when the job load and the low level scheduling policy were poorly matched.

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An experimental implementation of the kernel/domain architecture

Cited by 6 publications

References 15 publications

Engineering a security kernel for Multics

Engineering a security kernel for Multics

A hardware implementation of capability-based addressing

An experiment with the interchangeability of processes and monitors

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