An Experimental Study of Alternative Campaign Finance Systems: Transparency, Donations, and Policy Choices

Abstract

We experimentally study the transparency effect of alternative campaign finance systems on donations, election outcomes, policy choices, and welfare. Three alternatives are considered: one where donors' preferences and donations are unobserved by the candidate and public; one where they are observed by the candidate but not the public; and one where they are observed by all. We label them full anonymity (FA), partial anonymity (PA), and no anonymity (NA), respectively. We find that in NA and PA candidates consistently respond to donations by choosing policies favoring the donors. FA, in contrast, is the most successful in limiting the influence of donations on policy choices. Donors benefit greatly from the possibility of donations whereas social welfare may be harmed in some treatments. To our knowledge, this article is the first to investigate the effect of different campaign finance systems distinguished by their transparency level. (JEL D72)Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituents, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder. -U.S. Supreme Court, McConnell v. FEC [540 U.S. 93 (2003)]

Contribution Limits and Transparency in a Campaign Finance Experiment

“…Yet, there is little systematic study of these legislative changes and a lack of evidence that suggests both contribution limits and increased transparency are needed to enhance welfare. In order to fill that void, Fang, Shapiro, and Zillante () (hereafter FSZ) use a laboratory experiment to examine how interactions between transparency of donor identities and the number of donors impact voter and candidate behavior as well as social welfare…”

Analisa Pratik Formalitas Pelaporan Dana Kampanye Studi Eksploratif di Kota Batu

“…Peran agen yang seharusnya dapat mendukung terselenggaranya kampanye yang akuntabel dan transparan. Dengan dukungan struktur sosial yang baik, proses politik yang akuntabel dan transparan akan tercipta (Fang, Shapiro, & Arthur, 2016). Peranan pihak inti dan juga struktur sosial yang ada di partai politik juga mendorong praktik akuntabilitas dan transparansi dana kampanye (Giddens & Pierson, 1998).…”

“…Pada umumnya, meskipun praktik akuntabilitas dan transparansi dana kampanye adalah hal penting yang harus dijalankan, informan berharap dengan menjalankan praktik tersebut membawa dampak bagi partai politik (Fang et al, 2016;Shapiro & Arthur, 2017). Informan berpendapat bahwa karena kebijakan ini baru diadakan di pemilu tahun 2019, belum memunculkan dampak atau implikasi sesuai dengan yang diharapkan oleh partai politik.…”

“…Namun, akuntabilitas dan transparansi hanya saja tidak dicantumkan dalam norma dasar partai politik. Oleh karena itu, peran ketua umum dalam partai menjadi sangat dominan (Fang et al, 2016). Hal ini didukung dengan beberapa pernyataan informan H. Rudi, Ketua DPD sekaligus Ketua Fraksi PAN, H. Rudi menyampaikan hal sebagai berikut:…”

Does Public Attention Reduce the Influence of Moneyed Interests? Policy Positions on Sopa/Pipa Before and After the Internet Blackout

“…Second, and closely related to the question of how contributions from interest groups affect legislative behavior, are the questions of why donors contribute to which campaign and how contributions increase the probability of being elected. Regarding the former, theoretical models have been developed to analyze the contributors' rationale under different institutional settings (see, e.g., Aranson and Hinich ; Fang, Shapiro, and Zillante ) complemented by a growing empirical literature on the various possible motives of donors (see, e.g., Barber ; Bonica ; Gordon, Hafer, and Landa ). With regard to the latter question, a substantive number of studies have empirically investigated the relationship between campaign contributions and election probabilities (see, e.g., Gerber ; Jacobson , ; and recently Spenkuch and Toniatti ).…”