An experimental study of the Online Information Paradox: Does en-route information improve road network performance?

Abstract

This study investigates the empirical presence of a theoretical transportation paradox, defined as the “Online Information Paradox” (OIP). The paradox suggests that, for certain road networks, the provision of online information deteriorate travel conditions for all users of that network relative to the situation where no online information is provided to users. The analytical presence of the paradox was derived for a specific network structure by using two equilibrium models, the first being the Expected User Equilibrium (EUE) solution (no information scenario) and the other being the User Equilibrium with Recourse (UER) solution (with information scenario). An incentivised computerised route choice game was designed using the concepts of experimental economics and administered in a controlled laboratory environment to investigate the physical presence of the paradox. Aggregate statistics of path flows and Total System Travel Costs (TSTC) were used to compare the experimental results with the theoretical findings. A total of 12 groups of 12 participants completed the experiment and the OIP and the occurrence of the OIP being significant was observed in 11 of the 12 cases. Though information increased travel costs for users on average, it reduced the volatility of travel costs experienced in the no information scenario indicating that information can achieve a more reliable system. Further replications of similar experiments and more importantly field based identification of the phenomena will force transport professionals to be aware of the emergence of the paradox. In addition, studies such as this emphasise the need for the adoption of adaptive traffic assignment techniques to appropriately model the acquisition of information on a road network.

Price and Lead time Disclosure Strategies in Inventory Systems

“…In fact, a study by Arnott et al (1991) shows that in this case, drivers might change their departure times in such a way as to exacerbate congestion. Recently, Wijayaratna et al (2017) investigates empirically the presence of this transportation paradox and suggests that the online information provision deteriorates travel conditions for all users in certain road networks but leads to a reliable, yet expensive, system.…”

When a few undermine the whole: A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing

“…The results of these studies support equilibrium predictions for aggregate, but not individual, choice behavior. Other route choice experiments that involve complexities such as exogenous risks (Lu et al 2014) reveal more significant deviations from equilibrium predictions; these results have prompted researchers such as Dixit and Denant-Boemont (2014) and Wijayaratna et al (2017) to interpret the deviations with modified equilibrium concepts. A related topic is the study of departure time in transportation networks with bottleneck congestion (see, e.g., Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey 1990 for a theoretical treatment).…”

Shared Autonomous Taxi System and Utilization of Collected Travel-Time Information

“…The mean value of the path travel time can be expressed bŷ= ∑ ∈̂, wherêis the expected value of the travel time ( ) experienced by SATs on link . Considering the online information paradox [35], which means that the provision of incomplete or inaccurate information could deteriorate the transportation system, it is urgent and necessary to provide accurate information and use the information in an appropriate manner. In this study, two methodologies for using the collected information, real-time information, and historical information were investigated.…”