An Improved Constraint-Based System for the Verification of Security Protocols

Abstract

We propose a constraint-based system for the verification of security protocols that improves upon the one developed by Millen and Shmatikov [30]. Our system features (1) a significantly more efficient implementation, (2) a monotonic behavior, which also allows to detect flaws associated to partial runs and (3) a more expressive syntax, in which a principal may also perform explicit checks. In this paper we also show why these improvements yield a more effective and practical system.

OFMC: A symbolic model checker for security protocols

“…In this definition, we incorporate an optimization that we call step-compression, which is based on the idea [1,11,20,25,41] that we can identify the intruder and the network: every message sent by an honest agent is received by the intruder and every message received by an honest agent comes from the intruder. More specifically, we compose (or "compress") several steps: when the intruder sends a message, an agent reacts to it according to the agent's rules, and the intruder intercepts the agent's answer.…”

License Protection with a Tamper-Resistant Token

“…We have used the protocol verifier CoProVe [9] to verify Protocol A. Basically, what we needed to verify is that a malicious application would not be able to obtain the license without the correct intervention of the token.…”

Comparison of Cryptographic Verification Tools Dealing with Algebraic Properties

“…Over the last decades many automatic tools based on formal analysis techniques have been presented for verifying cryptographic protocols [2,8,11,14,18,29,31,33,40,20]. All these tools use the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder model.…”