In this paper we consider a game theoretical variant of the Steiner forest problem. An instance of this game consists of an undirected graph G = (V, E), non-negative costs c(e) for all edges e in E, and k players. Each player i has an associated pair of terminals s i and t i . Consider a forest F in G. We say that player i is serviced if s i and t i are connected in F. Player i derives a private utility u i for receiving service. In a recent paper, Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [12] showed that a natural primal-dual algorithm, KLS, gives rise to a 2-approximate budget balanced and group-strategyproof cost sharing method for the above game.In this paper we show that the techniques used in [12] yield a new linear programming relaxation for the Steiner forest problem: the lifted-cut relaxation. First, we give an alternate proof of the approximate budget-balance result in [12] by showing that the cost shares computed by algorithm KLS are feasible for the dual of this relaxation. Second, we are able to show that this new undirected relaxation for Steiner forests is strictly stronger than the well-studied undirected cut relaxation.We conclude the paper with a negative result, arguing that no cross-monotonic cost sharing method can achieve a budget balance factor of less than 2 for the Steiner tree and Steiner forest games. This shows that the results of [11,12] are essentially tight.