“…Habermas accepts the impossibility of realizing the always‐already‐presupposed idealization of communicative rationality: “the public sphere ideal is not perfectly reachable” (Habermas , p. 477). This impossibility is not just due to empirical “distortions” (which will be discussed further in the next section), but also to logical limits: Responding to his critics, Habermas has, particularly in recent times, argued that communicative rationality, and thus the deliberative public sphere norm, cannot be understood as an “end state,” a “final stage which can be realized in time” (Habermas as cited in Carleheden & Gabriëls, , p. 10), because if realized it “would make all further communication superfluous” (Habermas, , p. 1518). In other words, the full realization of communicative rationality would mean the end of communication, and human history, as it would eliminate those negative social conditions that make communication in social life necessary, “conditions such as inadequate information, interpersonal misunderstandings, lack of insight, and so on” (Cooke, , p. 417, referring to Albrecht Wellmer's work).…”