An intra-party account of electoral system choice

Abstract

We present an intra-party account of electoral reform, contrasting the incentives of legislators (MPs) with those of party leaders. We develop our argument along the switch to proportional representation (PR) in early 20th century Europe. District-level electoral alliances allowed bourgeois MPs to counter the “socialist threat” under the electoral systems in place. PR was thus unnecessary from the seat-maximizing perspective that dominates previous accounts—intra-party considerations were crucial: candidate nomination and legislative cohesion. We show our argument to hold empirically both for the prototypical case of Germany, 1890–1920, using encompassing district-level data on candidatures, elections, electoral alliances, roll call votes and a series of simulations on reform effects; and for the implementation of electoral reforms in 29 countries, 1900–31.

When dominant parties adopt proportional representation: the mysterious case of Belgium

“…Hence, unlike recent contributions that stress the differing interests of party leadership and backbenchers (Cox et al, 2019;Schröder and Manow, 2019), we argue that the main line of disagreement may also stem from the programmatic interests of different factions within a party. The Catholics' conservative and progressive wings were both interested in preserving the party's majority position.…”

“…Second, in line with recent contributions (e.g. Cox et al, 2019;Schröder and Manow, 2019), we emphasize intra-party divisions over electoral reform. More precisely, we argue that differences in exposure to electoral competition influences the reforms considered and the degree of intra-party conflict over reforms.…”

“…The literature on European political history shows that electoral alliances between socialist and nonsocialist parties as well as joint campaigns for PR were in fact quite common at the beginning of the 20th century. Even though some authors have started to recognize the importance of intra-party conflicts (Cox et al, 2019;Schröder and Manow, 2019) or coalitions between socialist and nonsocialist parties (Rodden, 2009;Emmenegger and Walter, 2019), they have not yet been systematically incorporated in explanations of electoral system choice. Similarly, research has only begun to explore variation in the effective degree of proportionality of PR systems (Bol et al, 2015;Walter and Emmenegger, 2019) and its political consequences (Carey and Hix, 2011;Kedar et al, 2016).…”

Socialist Threat? Radical Party Entry, Electoral Alliances, and the Introduction of Proportional Representation

“…Importantly, my findings do not imply that the emergence of strong socialist parties was of no relevance for the introduction of PR. Other approaches have also linked the rise of the left to the introduction of PR but emphasized different mechanisms (Calvo 2009;Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2019;Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007;Schröder and Manow 2020). My contribution thus adds to the literature by echoing the emphasis of previous work to explore other mechanisms that link party entry to electoral reforms.…”

Max Weber und die Demokratie

“…43 Dass sie sich aber selbst -vermittels des Wahlrechts -eine spezifische Organisationsform geben und dass dies von alles überragender Bedeutung für die Funktionsweise der repräsentativen Demokratie ist, entgeht Weber. Bei aller scharfen, ätzenden Polemik gegenüber den Honoratiorenparteien vermag Weber nicht zu sehen, dass genau dieser Parteientypus das Resultat bestimmter wahlrechtlicher Anreizmechanismen war, nämlich des absoluten Mehrheitswahlrechts des Kaiserreichs mit seinem Vorherrschen zunehmend heterogener Wahlkreisabsprachen, 44 die das Verhältniswahlrecht, 1918 beschlossen, 1919 erstmals angewendet, nun gerade beseitigte.…”