2021
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.13276
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An Introduction: “Macroeconomic Policy Coordination and Domestic Politics: Policy Coordination in the EU from the European Semester to the Covid‐19 Crisis”*

Abstract: The Next Generation EU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) encompassed the European Semester. To understand how and why this happened we apply different theoretical approaches so as to emphasize different aspects of this process. The contributions in this collection discuss three main questions: (1) Is the Semester successfully implemented in the domestic arena? (2) Do domestic institutions and stakeholders play a crucial role in the success (or lack thereof) of the Semester? (3) What lessons… Show more

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Cited by 22 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The more difficult the negotiations between the Commission and the national government, the more carefully they are kept out of the public eye, which makes it difficult for the national parliaments to hold their own governments accountable. If the system really 'worked'in the sense of the Commission providing de facto binding guidance on national budgetary policies that the member states would followit would significantly infringe parliamentary powers at the national level; yet the European Semester recommendations have a weak level of implementation (Verdun and D'Erman 2022). This is explained as a problem of a lack of ownership of the EU recommendations by the member states (see Leino-Sandberg and Losada Fraga 2020).…”
Section: Euro Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The more difficult the negotiations between the Commission and the national government, the more carefully they are kept out of the public eye, which makes it difficult for the national parliaments to hold their own governments accountable. If the system really 'worked'in the sense of the Commission providing de facto binding guidance on national budgetary policies that the member states would followit would significantly infringe parliamentary powers at the national level; yet the European Semester recommendations have a weak level of implementation (Verdun and D'Erman 2022). This is explained as a problem of a lack of ownership of the EU recommendations by the member states (see Leino-Sandberg and Losada Fraga 2020).…”
Section: Euro Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Whereas economic adjustment programs from the time of the eurozone crisis followed a top‐down approach and entailed elements of conditionality and coercion, the insufficient implementation of the country‐specific recommendations in the context of the European Semester usually originates from a lack of national ownership (cf. D'Erman & Verdun, 2022). NGEU might thus pave the way for a new mode of EU policy‐making.…”
Section: Implementing the Rrf In 2021: Legal Rules And Institutional ...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In 2020–21, the Member States correctly supported income maintenance first and then co‐ordinated at the EU level Next Generation (Schramm et al, 2022) – blending elements of demand stimulus via financial measures with macro‐economic policy co‐ordination and measures to re‐configure the supply (Fabbrini, 2022; on macro‐economic policy see D'Erman and Verdun, 2022). Analogies did not seem to fool the EU this time.…”
Section: Putting Flesh On the Conceptual Bonesmentioning
confidence: 99%