An Introduction to Law and Regulation

Morgan, Bronwen; Yeung, Karen

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511801112

Cited by 268 publications

(113 citation statements)

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“…True enough, as a mode of governance regulation can take different forms and serve many masters. That much is already reflected in the debate between opponents and proponents of private-interest and public-interest theories of regulation (for an updated comprehensive overview, see Morgan & Yeung, 2007). From a private-interest perspective, regulation may legitimize public programs that serve the few at the expense of the many; it can serve as a mask for policy actors and institutions that in effect rob or marginalize the weakest sections of society.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory capitalism and the reassertion of the public interest

Levi‐Faur

2009

Policy and Society

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Neoliberalism has not led to the retreat of the state but instead to the restructuring of the state. This has led to new forms of governance where regulation represents the expanding part of government, and where the various modes of governance compete and sometimes are synthesized into global forms of regulation. It will be discussed where such forms have emerged, and where they are yet to emerge. In this new order, best described as regulatory capitalism, the regulatory state meets the regulatory society and actors' demand for and supply of regulation is ever expanding. Rule-making, monitoring and enforcement are becoming increasingly important for democratic policy making. It is being asserted that varieties of regulatory capitalism are produced by the interaction of varying degrees of civil-and state-regulation and variations in the composition of the networks that serve as the backbone that transform autonomous jurisdictions to interdependent ones. Accordingly the paper distinguishes between Corporatists, Pluralist, Command & Control and Laissez-Faire forms of regulatory capitalism.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory capitalism and the reassertion of the public interest

Levi‐Faur

2009

Policy and Society

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“…Alongside this, we formulate recommendations informed by our research, concentrating on regulations aiming to increase the "bureaucratic transparency" [74] of the reimbursement process, as this goal should be shared by all stakeholders [75]. One way of optimising this process is to adopt a cybernetic cycle of regulation [76] …”

Section: Discussion and Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The politics of health technology assessment in Poland

2012

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“…ways of gathering information ('information gathering and monitoring'); ways of setting standards, goals or targets ('standardsetting'); and ways of changing behaviour to meet the standards or targets ('behaviour modification') (Hood et al 2001). Within this literature, the techniques employed by regulators to attain their desired social outcome are well established as an object of study (Morgan and Yeung 2007). While legal scholars tend to focus on traditional 'command and control' techniques in which the law prohibits specified conduct, backed by coercive sanctions for violation, cyberlawyers and criminologists have explored how 'design' (or 'code') operates as a regulatory instrument (Lessig 1999;Zittrain 2007;von Hirsh et al 2000;Clarke and Newman 2005).…”

Section: Design-based Regulatory Techniquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design

Yeung

2016

Information, Communication & Society

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(250 words max)This paper draws on regulatory governance scholarship to argue that the analytic phenomenon currently known as 'Big Data' can be understood as a mode of 'design-based' regulation. Although Big Data decision-making technologies can take the form of automated decision-making systems, this paper focuses on algorithmic decision-guidance techniques. By highlighting correlations between data items that would not otherwise be observable, these techniques are being used to shape the informational choice context in which individual decision-making occurs, with the aim of channelling attention and decision-making in directions preferred by the 'choice architect'. By relying upon the use of 'nudge'-a particular form of choice architecture that alters people's behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives, these techniques constitute a 'soft' form of design-based control. But, unlike the static Nudges popularised by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) such as placing the salad in front of the lasagne to encourage healthy eating, Big Data analytics nudges are extremely powerful and potent due to their networked, continuously updated, dynamic and pervasive nature (hence 'hypernudge'). I adopt a liberal, rights-based critique of these techniques, contrasting liberal theoretical accounts with selective insights from science and technology studies (STS) and surveillance studies on the other. I argue that concerns about the legitimacy of these techniques are not satisfactorily resolved through reliance on individual notice and consent, touching upon the troubling implications for democracy and human flourishing if Big Data analytic techniques driven by commercial self-interest continue their onward march unchecked by effective and legitimate constraints.

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An Introduction to Law and Regulation

Cited by 268 publications

References 0 publications

Regulatory capitalism and the reassertion of the public interest

Regulatory capitalism and the reassertion of the public interest

The politics of health technology assessment in Poland

‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design

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