An Optimal Control Model of the Low-Carbon Supply Chain: Joint Emission Reduction, Pricing Strategies, and New Coordination Contract Design

Yu, Hui; Bai, Shizhen; Chen, Dongyan

doi:10.1109/access.2020.3000482

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…As seen from Table 2, the research object of supply chain green technology innovation has been limited to a single firm, such as in [12], [20], [28], [29]; between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain, including one supplier and one manufacturer, such as in [21], [24], 27]; or between one manufacturer and one retailer, such as in [18], 19], [22], [23], [25]. [26] also studied a two-level supply chain with two competing downstream retailers .…”

Section: Numerical Simulation and Results Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yu et al hypothesized that product demand is related to its carbon emission reduction level and that the carbon emission reduction level is continuously evolving according to a given linear differential equation. Based on differential game theory, the joint emission reduction efforts, pricing strategies, and optimal emissions for both parties in the supply chain are obtained, the results of which show that both parties in the supply chain can achieve a win-win situation in terms of both supply chain benefits and ecology [18]. Swami and others considered the problem of the coordination of a manufacturer and a retailer in a vertical supply chain, addressing some pertinent questions in this regard, such as those related to the extent of efforts in greening operations by manufacturers or retailers, the level of cooperation between the two parties, and how to coordinate their operations in a supply chain.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Guo

2022

IEEE Access

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This paper examines a complex supply chain consisting of a raw material manufacturer, a consumer goods fabricator, a retailer and an end user. A sequential decision game model is constructed under carbon tax regulation, considering multiparty green technology innovation and green product marketing efforts in the supply chain. Using a backward-induction analysis process, the Nash equilibria of the game are obtained. With the help of numerical simulation, the sensitivity analysis of the key parameters affecting system performance is carried out. We find the following results. (i) Carbon tax regulation brings about a new cost burden for supply chain members in different ways, with the largest impact being on the profit of the raw material manufacturer. (ii) The marginal emission reduction effect of carbon tax regulation shows a declining trend. The cost of greening efforts will exceed the carbon tax rate as it continues to rise. (iii) Customer demand is significantly affected by the footprint and energy efficiency of products and is much more relevant for energy efficiency than for footprint in the production phase.INDEX TERMS carbon tax, game, green technology renovation, simulation, supply chain I. INTRODUCTION

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Section: Numerical Simulation and Results Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Guo

2022

IEEE Access

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“…This research studied channel structure and pricing decisions for the manufacturer and government"s subsidy policy with competing new and remanufactured products. Reference [33] contended with the joint emission reduction and pricing decision problems, as well as coordination contract design issue for a class of two-echelon low-carbon supply chain system. The dyadic supply chain system consisting of manufacturer and retailer or production inventory system were discussed, which considered the influence of consumers" low-carbon preferences on random variable demand and the impact of uncertainty on carbon emissionreduction behavior [34].…”

Section: B Carbon Emissions Allocation and Abatement Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The manufacturer M also pays attention to the emission reduction investment of supplier S and the promotion of retailer R. In the meantime, it shares a certain proportion of the costs for the upstream and downstream. The construction method refer to the References [20][21][22], [32][33][34]. Therefore, the decisions of three parties are proposed as.…”

Section: A Non-cooperative Decision-making Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-Cooperative Game and Cooperative Operation of Multi-Level Supply Chain Under Background of Carbon Emission Reduction

et al. 2022

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In the context of global efforts to develop low-carbon economy and curb the growth of fossil energy, it is particularly important for supply chain enterprises to make scientific decisions on emission reduction and energy conservation. This paper investigates supply chain enterprises to make emission reduction decisions by considering cost-benefit of carbon emission reduction and internal and external factors changes. We analyze the dynamic game model of a three-level supply chain consisting of suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers in cooperative and non-cooperative states. The change of optimal emission reduction is calculated by differential game and dynamic analysis. The optimal profit is obtained from the corresponding optimal decision of enterprises, and the optimal proportion of manufacturers" share of emission reduction cost is studied. We adopt numerical simulation method to simulate decision-making evolution process of emission reduction. Finally, the impact of different influencing factors on product emission reductions, supply chain decisions and profits are shown. These findings can provide theoretical support and reference for multi-level supply chain decision-making.

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“…Guan et al [ 28 ] studied a supply chain coordination problem with a manufacturer and a retailer that have Nash bargaining fairness concerns. Yu et al [ 29 ] established the optimal control model, researched the joint emission reduction issue, and designed a new coordination contract.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

Zhang

2021

IJERPH

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Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.

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An Optimal Control Model of the Low-Carbon Supply Chain: Joint Emission Reduction, Pricing Strategies, and New Coordination Contract Design

Cited by 14 publications

References 27 publications

Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Non-Cooperative Game and Cooperative Operation of Multi-Level Supply Chain Under Background of Carbon Emission Reduction

Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

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