An Overview of the SoBP for Software in the Context of DS 00-56 Issue 4

Menon, Catherine; Hawkins, Richard; McDermid, John; Kelly, Tim

doi:10.1007/978-1-84996-086-1_9

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…This paper has introduced the Standard of Best Practice (Menon et al 2009) for software compliance with DS 00-56 Issue 4. In Section 2 we described the basic structure of the SoBP, emphasising the distinction between the managerial and technical perspectives.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Overview of the SoBP for Software in the Context of DS 00-56 Issue 4

Menon

Hawkins

McDermid

et al. 2009

Making Systems Safer

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Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4 is the current contractual safety standard for UK MOD projects. It requires the production of a structured argument, supported by diverse evidence, to show that a system is safe for a defined purpose within a defined environment. This paper introduces a Standard of Best Practice which has been produced by the Software Systems Engineering Initiative to provide guidance for software compliance with Defence Standard 00-56 Issue 4.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This paper introduces the first issue of the SoBP (Menon et al 2009), which was completed in August 2009 and is currently available from the SSEI website.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Overview of the SoBP for Software in the Context of DS 00-56 Issue 4

Menon

Hawkins

McDermid

et al. 2009

Making Systems Safer

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“…For example, it is not possible to compose two safety case modules which make certain conflicting assumptions about their operating environment. Neither is it possible to compose two safety case modules where the circumstances under which the evidence for one was generated are insufficiently similar [5] to those under which the evidence for the other was generated.…”

Section: A Composition Of Safety Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Well-behavedness of software in a SoS refers to the general integrity [5] of that software's behaviours: in essence, well-behavedness is a requirement that certain categories of undesirable behaviour should not occur. Examples of well-behavedness requirements include those relating to non-interference between components, the absence of unintended communications between components, absence of data corruption across communication paths, and absence of resource starvation.…”

Section: Safety Case Architectures and Negative Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eliciting software safety requirements in complex systems

Menon

Kelly

2010

2010 IEEE International Systems Conference

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Abstract-We present a discussion of the issues involved with eliciting and managing safety requirements in complex systems. We show how safety case architectures present a modular view of a safety case which is consistent with the modular structure of a system of systems. These architectures can also be used to allocate responsibility for safety analysis across contractual boundaries. This paper discusses how these architectures can be used to address the technical and engineering management challenges associated with safety analysis in complex systems.

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“…The pattern catalogue is summarized in [1] and documented fully in Appendix B of [2]. The philosophy underpinning these patterns is that developers must demonstrate assurance in the same fundamental safety claims for all software used in a safety related role; the difference between arguments for different systems is in the way in which these claims are ultimately supported.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using a Software Safety Argument Pattern Catalogue: Two Case Studies

Hawkins

Clegg

Alexander

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Software safety cases encourage developers to carry out only those safety activities that actually reduce risk. In practice this is not always achieved. To help remedy this, the SSEI at the University of York has developed a set of software safety argument patterns. This paper reports on using the patterns in two real-world case studies, evaluating the patterns' use against criteria that includes flexibility, ability to reveal assurance decits and ability to focus the case on software contributions to hazards. The case studies demonstrated that the safety patterns can be applied to a range of system types regardless of the stage or type of development process, that they help limit safety case activities to those that are significant for achieving safety, and that they help developers nd assurance deficits in their safety case arguments. The case study reports discuss the difficulties of applying the patterns, particularly in the case of users who are unfamiliar with the approach, and the authors recognise in response the need for better instructional material. But the results show that as part of the development of best practice in safety, the patterns promise signicant benets to industrial safety case creators.

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An Overview of the SoBP for Software in the Context of DS 00-56 Issue 4

Cited by 8 publications

References 1 publication

An Overview of the SoBP for Software in the Context of DS 00-56 Issue 4

An Overview of the SoBP for Software in the Context of DS 00-56 Issue 4

Eliciting software safety requirements in complex systems

Using a Software Safety Argument Pattern Catalogue: Two Case Studies

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