Analogical Reasoning and Conceptual Change: A Case Study of Johannes Kepler

Gentner, Dedre; Brem, Sarah K.; Ferguson, Ronald W.; Markman, Arthur B.; Levidow, Bjorn B; Wolff, Phillip; Forbus, Kenneth D.

doi:10.1207/s15327809jls0601_2

Cited by 171 publications

(92 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…Kepler and Newton used dynamic descriptions. Kepler, for example, introduced the idea that the sun exerts a force that causes the trajectory of the planets (Gentner et al, 1997). A central property of DM is the direct representation of rate.…”

Section: The Dynamic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical Imagery: Kinematic versus Dynamic Models

Schwartz

1999

Cognitive Psychology

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Physical imagery occurs when people imagine one object causing a change to a second object. To make inferences through physical imagery, people must represent information that coordinates the interactions among the imagined objects. The current research contrasts two proposals for how this coordinating information is realized in physical imagery. In the traditional kinematic formulation, imagery transformations are coordinated by geometric information in analog spatial representations. In the dynamic formulation, transformations may also be regulated by analog representations of force and resistance. Four experiments support the dynamic formulation. They show, for example, that without making changes to the spatial properties of a problem, dynamic perceptual information (e.g., torque) and beliefs about physical properties (e.g., viscosity) affect the inferences that people draw through imagery. The studies suggest that physical imagery is not so much an analog of visual perception as it is an analog of physical action. A simple model that represents force as a rate helps explain why inferences can emerge through imagined actions even though people may not know the answer explicitly. It also explains how and when perception, beliefs, and learning can influence physical imagery. © 1999 Academic PressPeople solve spatial problems about shape, position, change of perspective, and navigation. People also solve physical problems about forces, resistances, and how one object causes changes to another. To a large extent, research on physical problem solving has emphasized people's beliefs and qualitative theories about physical behaviors, and research on spatial problem solving has emphasized people's analog representations of visual perception. As a consequence, research relevant to analog representation has generally investigated spatial and visual issues but not physical and haptic issues. This seems like an omission. Imagine, for example, running wall-towall in a breezy room and then imagine running wall-to-wall in waist deep water. Even though many of the spatial relations are identical, the effect of imagined resistance is introspectively compelling. Less introspectively, Sashank Varma was an invaluable source of ideas. I thank John Rieser and Howard Sandler for many productive conversations. I also thank several anonymous reviewers for their patience and detailed commentary.

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Section: The Dynamic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Physical Imagery: Kinematic versus Dynamic Models

Schwartz

1999

Cognitive Psychology

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“…EXPERIMENT 5 Inference projection is a common mode of conceptual change in theories of literal similarity, analogy, and metaphor (e .g ., Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990 ;Keane, 1988 ;Ortony, 1979) . Nevertheless, there are other ways in which a comparison can change its target (Gentner, Brem, Ferguson, Wolff, Markman, & Forbus, 1997 ;Gentner and Wolff, in press) . In our discussion of SME, we noted three such means : structural highlighting, restructuring, and rerepresentation .…”

Section: Inference Codingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Informativity and Asymmetry in Comparisons

Bowdle¹,

Gentner²

1997

Cognitive Psychology

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We propose an account of comparison asymmetries based on viewing comparison as a process of structural alignment and mapping . Specifically, we hypothesize that (1) comparison asymmetries result from directional differences in informativity, and that (2) asymmetries can therefore be predicted from the relative degree of systematicity or conceptual coherence of the items being compared . In Experiment 1, we found a clear preference for placing the more systematic of two passages in the base position of a comparison . Experiments 1 and 2 further showed that structural alignability is crucial in obtaining such asymmetries . In Experiment 3, we found that asymmetries are predicted by the relative systematicity of the comparisons items rather than by the relative size of the distinctive feature sets . These results are inconsistent with accounts of asymmetry based on feature contrast or stimulus bias . In Experiments 4 through 6, we tested the functional implications of our account by examining inference projection and perceived informativity across asymmetric comparisons . Critically, comparisons having the more systematic item as the base were more likely to result in inference projection and other forms of target modification and were rated as more informative than reverse comparisons . We conclude by demonstrating that this account can explain comparison asymmetries without positing underlying asymmetries in subjective similarity, and that it offers a unified approach to the directionality of literal comparisons, analogies, and metaphors .

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“…Yet, the existence of linguistic metaphors in a culture is not evidence of prelinguistic mental metaphors in the individual. Metaphors in language and other linguistic structures (e.g., words for exact numbers) can precede concepts in the individual learner and lead to the creation of new conceptual links via learning processes that do not need to be grounded directly in perceptuomotor experience (see Carey, 2004;Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993;Gentner et al, 1997). Even if direct bodily experience is necessary on the timescale of biological evolution or cultural/linguistic evolution, it may not be necessary on the timescale of conceptual development in the individual learner (Tomasello, 2003;Vygotsky, 1934Vygotsky, /1986.…”

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confidence: 99%

Embodiment of abstract concepts: Good and bad in right- and left-handers.

Casasanto

2009

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

630

661

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Do people with different kinds of bodies think differently? According to the body-specificity hypothesis, people who interact with their physical environments in systematically different ways should form correspondingly different mental representations. In a test of this hypothesis, 5 experiments investigated links between handedness and the mental representation of abstract concepts with positive or negative valence (e.g., honesty, sadness, intelligence). Mappings from spatial location to emotional valence differed between rightand left-handed participants. Right-handers tended to associate rightward space with positive ideas and leftward space with negative ideas, but left-handers showed the opposite pattern, associating rightward space with negative ideas and leftward with positive ideas. These contrasting mental metaphors for valence cannot be attributed to linguistic experience, because idioms in English associate good with right but not with left. Rather, right-and left-handers implicitly associated positive valence more strongly with the side of space on which they could act more fluently with their dominant hands. These results support the body-specificity hypothesis and provide evidence for the perceptuomotor basis of even the most abstract ideas.

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Analogical Reasoning and Conceptual Change: A Case Study of Johannes Kepler

Cited by 171 publications

References 51 publications

Physical Imagery: Kinematic versus Dynamic Models

Physical Imagery: Kinematic versus Dynamic Models

Informativity and Asymmetry in Comparisons

Embodiment of abstract concepts: Good and bad in right- and left-handers.

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