Learning about biological evolution presents particular challenges for students. Barriers to learning come in the form of students' prior conceptions that conflict with the scientific perspective of biological change. Theory and research from developmental and educational psychology provide insight into these barriers. Helping students understand evolution is not simply a matter of adding to their existing knowledge, but rather, it means helping them to see the world in new and different ways. Theoretical perspectives on creating change in students' conceptions have implications for teaching about biological evolution.

Evolutionary science has consequences for individuals and society, ranging from the way we interpret human behavior to our notions of spirituality and the purpose of our existence. Popular portrayals of evolution depict a paradoxical theory, a source of knowledge and human connections, but also a threat to our humanity and freedom. Using quantitative and qualitative methodology, we examined how college‐educated adults (n = 135) from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds perceive the impact of evolutionary theory on individuals and society. We identified a continuum of perspectives, ranging from strong creationist to strong evolutionist. Using the model of “knowledge as an ecology” (Demastes, Good, & Peebles, Science Education, 79, 637–666, 1995; Nardi & O'Day, Information ecologies: Using technology with heart, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999), we examined the relationships among participants' beliefs, their perceptions regarding the social and personal impact of evolutionary theory, their prior exposure to and knowledge of evolutionary theory, and their opinions regarding the teaching of evolution. Evolutionists and creationists differed in their prior exposure to evolutionary theory, and their opinions about some aspects of teaching, but showed striking similarities regarding perceived impact. All groups viewed the consequences of accepting evolutionary principles in a way that might be considered undesirable: increased selfishness and racism, decreased spirituality, and a decreased sense of purpose and self‐determination. From a science education perspective, this one‐sided interpretation is troublesome because it runs counter to the available evidence and theories in evolutionary science, and we consider ways of fostering more balanced presentation and appraisal of evolutionary theory. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 87:181–206, 2003; Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI 10.1002/sce.10045

Understanding what teachers need to be more comfortable and confident in their profession is crucial to the future of effective teachers and scientific literacy in public schools. This study focuses on the experiences of Arizona biology teachers in teaching evolution, using a clinical model of stress to identify sources of pressure, the resulting stresses, and coping strategies they employ to alleviate these stresses. We conducted focus groups, one‐on‐one interviews, and written surveys with 15 biology teachers from the Phoenix area. On the basis of their responses, teachers were clustered into three categories: “Conflicted,” who struggle with their own beliefs and the possible impact of their teaching, “Selective,” who carefully avoid difficult topics and situations, and “Scientists,” who see no place for controversial social issues in their science classroom. Teachers from each group felt that they could be more effective in teaching evolution if they possessed the most up‐to‐date information about evolution and genomics, a safe space in which to reflect on the possible social and personal implications with their peers, and access to richer lesson plans for teaching evolution that include not only science but personal stories regarding how the lessons arose, and what problems and opportunities they created. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Res Sci Teach 41: 791–809, 2004

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A substantial body of evidence shows that people tend to rely too heavily on explanations when trying to justify an opinion. Some research suggests these errors may arise from an inability to distinguish between explanations and the evidence that bears upon them. We examine an alternative account, that many people do distinguish between explanations and evidence, but rely more heavily on unsubstantiated explanations when evidence is scarce or absent. We examine the philosophical and psychological distinctions between explanation and evidence, and show that participants use explanations as a substitute for missing evidence. Experiment 1 replicates the results of other researchers, but further shows that participants generate more evidence when they are not constrained by their lack of data. Merely mentioning a source of data can alter both their evaluation (Experiment 2) and their production (Experiment 3) of explanations and evidence. In Experiment 4, we show that participants can explicitly consider the availability of evidence and other pragmatic factors when evaluating arguments. Finally, we consider the implications of using explanations to replace missing evidence as a strategy in argument.