Analyses of several recently proposed group key management schemes

Liu, Niu; Tang, Shaohua; Xu, Lingling; He, Daojing

doi:10.1002/sec.966

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…They result in the same number of rekeying messages, the same computation cost by each member and by each member, and the number of stored keys by the member. Aside from the general attacks presented in Table 3, several Piao scheme attacks have been proposed in the literature, such as [15] and [13]. Such attacks destroy trust in the polynomial-based key management schemes.…”

Section: Comparison With Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

KeyShield: A Scalable and Quantum-Safe Key Management Scheme

Aldarwbi

Ghorbani

Lashkari

2021

IEEE Open J. Commun. Soc.

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While encryption is powerful at protecting information, it critically relies upon the mystery/private cryptographic key's security. Poor key management would compromise any robust encryption algorithm. In this way, securing information is reduced to the issue of securing such keys from unauthorized access. In this work, KeyShield is proposed, a scalable and quantum-safe key management scheme. KeyShield provides the highest security level as it relies on the impossibility of finding a unique solution to an underdetermined linear system of equations. KeyShield achieves the rekeying using a single broadcast message, called a secure lock, in an open channel rather than pairwise secure channels. Security analyses for a list of attacks are provided, along with a detailed discussion on the quantum-safe feature. KeyShield outperforms state-of-the-art schemes in several aspects, including quantum-resistance, computation cost, message overhead, storage cost, and rekeying delay.

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Section: Comparison With Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

KeyShield: A Scalable and Quantum-Safe Key Management Scheme

Aldarwbi

Ghorbani

Lashkari

2021

IEEE Open J. Commun. Soc.

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“…In [16], authors show that Piao et al scheme does not ensure neither backward nor forward secrecy. In [21] authors show that Piao et al is based on a mathematical problem computable within a reasonable amount of resources (time and computation power). An attacker can easily factorize the polynomial over a nite eld and retrieve the private keys of the members, as well as the exchanged secrets.…”

Section: Dbgk [3]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fault-Tolerant and Scalable Key Management Protocol for IoT-Based Collaborative Groups

Abdmeziem

Charoy

2018

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Securing collaborative applications relies heavily on the underlying group key management protocols. Designing these protocols is challenging, especially in the context of the Internet of Things (IoT). Indeed, the presence of heterogeneous and dynamic members within the collaborative groups usually involves resource constrained entities, which require energy-aware protocols to manage frequent arrivals and departures of members. Moreover, both fault tolerance and scalability are sought for sensitive and large collaborative groups. To address these challenges, we propose to enhance our previously proposed protocol (i.e. DBGK) with polynomial computations. In fact, our contribution in this paper, allows additional controllers to be included with no impact on storage cost regarding constrained members. To assess our protocol called DsBGK, we conducted extensive simulations. Results conrmed that DsBGK achieves a better scalability and fault tolerance compared to DBGK. In addition, energy consumption induced by group key rekeying has been reduced.

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“…We find that the situation is still not very optimistic after our uncompleted investigation. We have found new flaws in schemes proposed recently and a few years ago. We will try to show these problems and analyze the underlying reasons in our series of studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Yet another attack on the chinese remainder theorem-based hierarchical access control scheme

Liu

Tang

2013

Security Comm. Networks

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Abstract. The hierarchical access control scheme based on Chinese Reminder Theorem [49] (CRTHACS) was supposed to be capable of hiding hierarchical structure, but Geiselmann et al. [18] showed practical attacks on CRTHACS to reveal the hierarchies it hides. Then, Zou et al. modified it, and gave a new CRTHACS [50] to resist those attacks. Nevertheless, we find that the modified version is still defective if it permits changes of structure, i.e. the scheme works in a dynamic scenario. In this paper, we describe our attack on the modified version of CRTHACS. We extend the description of the CRTHACS in a more proper form making it easier for us to look into the problem it has. We find the key character of the vulnerability which we name as double-invariance. We generalize our attack in an algebraic form and apply it to a series of hierarchical cryptographic access control schemes that share the same vulnerability with CRTHACS. We also give the countermeasure to fix this vulnerability.

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Analyses of several recently proposed group key management schemes

Cited by 6 publications

References 51 publications

KeyShield: A Scalable and Quantum-Safe Key Management Scheme

KeyShield: A Scalable and Quantum-Safe Key Management Scheme

Fault-Tolerant and Scalable Key Management Protocol for IoT-Based Collaborative Groups

Yet another attack on the chinese remainder theorem-based hierarchical access control scheme

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