Analysis of embedded non-safety regulation games in China's two types of coal mines through safety performance disparity, 1980–2014

Liu, Quanlong; Li, Xinchun; Qiao, Wanguan; Meng, Xianglian; Li, Xiangong; Shi, Tian

doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.01.009

Cited by 26 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Early scholars applied evolutionary games to safe coal mine production; they mainly analysed the game between regulators and coal mining enterprises and identified insufficient investment in coal mine safety as the main cause of frequent accidents [22][23][24]. Some research studies have mainly focused on two-party evolutionary games [25][26][27][28][29]. However, the involved game participants are different; some games occur between coal mines, and some occur between coal mines and miners.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhou

Tang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Zhou

Tang

2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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“…The characteristics of China's "rich in coal, poor in oil, and few in gas" energy reserves, and the energy production structure and energy consumption structure, which are dominated by coal production, mean that coal will continue to be China's main energy source into the future. However, although China has made significant progress in coal mining technology and safety equipment configuration [1], coal mine accidents still occur frequently [2,3], and coal mine safety production is facing difficulties. Previous studies found that human factors have become the leading cause of coal mine accidents [4][5][6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, we designed a questionnaire to obtain relevant data and employed empirical analysis to explore the relationship between work commitment, cultural emotion, and unemployment risk perception. This study is innovative in the following three respects: (1) based on the inherent connection between emotions and behavior, the concept of cultural emotions is defined, and the three-dimensional structure is clarified from a material level, behavioral level, and conceptual level, which constitutes an important breakthrough in the theoretical study of cultural emotions. (2) This study conducted in-depth research on the connotation, structure, and measurement of unemployment risk perception, clarified the three-dimensional structural framework, thus providing a theoretical reference and methodological support for the assessment of employees' perceptions of unemployment risk.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Model of the Relationship between Miners’ Work Commitment, Cultural Emotion and Unemployment Risk Perception

Yang

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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The psychological health and work commitment of miners are prerequisites to ensuring their sustainable safety behavior, and it is also significant to the sustainable development of coal mines in China. In this context, we conducted a questionnaire survey among coal miners of state-owned coal enterprises to explore the relationships between cultural emotion, unemployment risk perception, Big Five personality traits, and work commitment. The results reveal that (1) cultural emotion and its three dimensions played a significant positive role in promoting work commitment. (2) Unemployment risk perception, policy unemployment risk perception, and individual differential unemployment risk perception had a negative moderating effect. (3) Moreover, work commitment was associated with differences in personality characteristics except for agreeableness. This research is of important theoretical value and practical significance, as it can guide Chinese coal miners to increase their work commitment and thereby improve safety in production.

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“…In order to ensure the sustainable development of the coal industry, we must pay attention to the safety of the coal industry. Currently, while the safety performance of coal mines in China has improved overwhelmingly year after year [1,2], coal-mine safety accidents are still frequent and the industry still has an appalling record of fatalities [3]. e losses caused by coalmine safety accidents are catastrophic.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

Zhang

Dai

et al. 2020

Complexity

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In view of the particularity and high risk of coal mining industry, the decision-making behavior of multiple agents inside the coal-mine enterprise plays a very important role in ensuring the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry. The existing literature studies on coal-mine safety production focus mainly on statically analyzing the game among the external entities such as the government, the enterprises themselves, and the employees inside the enterprise from a macro perspective,are short of research on revealing the dynamic interactions among the actors directly involved in the coal-mine accidents and also on proposals for effective interactions that will lead to improved safety outcomes. Therefore, this paper explores the use of evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in China’s coal-mine safety production system, which includes the organization, the first-line miners, and the first-line managers. Moreover, the paper also explores dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model to analyze the stability of stakeholder interactions and to identify equilibrium solutions. The simulation results show that when certain conditions are met, the decision-making behavior of the organization, miners, and managers can evolve into the unique ideal steady state (1, 1, 1). In addition, the strategy portfolio with a relatively high initial proportion of three agents converges more quickly to an ideal state than a relatively low strategy portfolio. Moreover, the stable state and equilibrium values are not affected by the initial value changes. Finally, we find that the combination of positive incentive policies and strict penalties policies can make the evolutionary game system converge to desired stability faster. The application of the evolutionary game and numerical simulation when simulating the multiplayer game process of coal-mine safety production is an effective way, which provides a more effective solution to the safety and sustainable development of coal mining industry.

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Analysis of embedded non-safety regulation games in China's two types of coal mines through safety performance disparity, 1980–2014

Cited by 26 publications

References 24 publications

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

A Comprehensive Model of the Relationship between Miners’ Work Commitment, Cultural Emotion and Unemployment Risk Perception

Game Modelling and Strategy Research on Trilateral Evolution for Coal-Mine Operational Safety Production System: A Simulation Approach

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