Analysis of operations and cyber security policies for a             system of cooperating Flexible Alternating Current             Transmission System (FACTS) devices.

Phillips, Laurence R.; Tejani, Bankim; Margulies, Jonathan; Hills, Jason L.; Richardson, Bryan T.; Baca, Micheal J.; Weiland, Laura

doi:10.2172/882347

Cited by 23 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Laurence Phillips and his colleagues present a comprehensive security analysis of FACTS devices. 5 Voltage control is also a hierarchical distributed system. In addition to the primary voltage control elements we described (FACTS, AVR, and so forth), a supervisory control layer defines the voltage for all regions in the system based on reactive optimal power flow (OPF) calculations.…”

Section: Voltage Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control Systems for the Power Grid and Their Resiliency to Attacks

Barreto¹,

Giraldo

Cárdenas³

et al. 2014

IEEE Secur. Privacy

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Most government, industry, and academic e orts to protect the power grid have focused on information security mechanisms for preventing and detecting attacks. In addition to these mechanisms, control engineering can help improve power grid security.A large body of work focuses on power grid system device vulnerability assessment 1 ; however, successfully compromising a power grid's computers and embedded systems is only the rst step in a successful a ack. To predictably modify the physical components of a power grid (for instance, strategically manipulating voltages or loads), a ackers must understand how control systems operate.Defenders who leverage only information security mechanisms to protect their power grid will have limited success against sophisticated a ackers. To develop a defense-in-depth security strategy, defenders must incorporate power grid control models to understand the vulnerabilities and fragility of the system they're trying to protect (for example, not all compromised devices can drive a system to an unsafe state) as well as design a ack-resilient control algorithms that can survive a partial system compromise.To facilitate the integration of control engineering with security, we introduce the role of control systems for the power grid, show how to model control system vulnerability by looking at the a ected physical states, and o er design suggestions for a ack-resilient control systems.ere's a signi cant amount of IT security and privacy work for the power grid: Álvaro Cárdenas and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini conducted a general survey including government and industry e orts, 2 and Igor Fovino discussed the role of IT security in industrial control systems. 3 However, in this article, we focus on control systems' (and a acks') e ects on physical variables, including voltages, frequencies, and currents. Power Grid Control Systemse power grid's objective is to generate and then deliver enough electric power to match consumer demand. In general, we can divide the power grid into three major parts: generation, transmission, and distribution.Generation consists of power plants producing electric power from natural resources, such as coal, water, or nuclear energy. Power is then transferred from generating power plants to electrical substations through

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Section: Voltage Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

Control Systems for the Power Grid and Their Resiliency to Attacks

Barreto¹,

Giraldo

Cárdenas³

et al. 2014

IEEE Secur. Privacy

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“…A unified power flow controller (UPFC) device [4,11] is a FACTS device that can modify the active flow of power in a line. The FACTS devices considered in this paper are UPFC devices.…”

Section: Facts Devices and Cfpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Phillips and co-workers [11] have conducted a broad investigation of the operational and security challenges involving FACTS devices. Their analysis is based on best practices for supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security of Information Flow in the Electric Power Grid

Tang

McMillin

IFIP International Federation for Information Processing

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The confidentiality of information in a system can be breached through unrestricted information flow. The formal properties of non-deducibility and non-inference are often used to assess information flow in purely cyber environments. However, in a "cyber-physical system" (CPS), i.e., a system with significant cyber and physical components, physical actions may allow confidential information to be deduced or inferred. This paper conducts an information flow analysis of a CPS using formal models of confidentiality. The specific CPS under study is the advanced electric power grid using cooperating flexible alternating current transmission system (FACTS) devices. FACTS devices exchange confidential information and use the information to produce physical actions on the electric power grid. This paper shows that even if the information flow satisfies certain security models, confidential information may still be deduced by observation or inference of a CPS at its cyber-physical boundary. The result is important because it helps assess the confidentiality of CPSs.

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“…Cyber Vulnerabilities and Solutions: All four types of attacks are effective options against the VAR compensation control loop. In [40], the authors identify a list of attack vectors that could be used against Cooperating FACTS Devices (CFD). Though attacks such as denial of service and data injection are well studied and understood in the traditional IT environment, the authors provide an insight into what these attacks mean in a CFD environment.…”

Section: Generation Control and Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber risk modeling and attack-resilient control for power grid

Sridhar¹

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Analysis of operations and cyber security policies for a system of cooperating Flexible Alternating Current Transmission System (FACTS) devices.

Cited by 23 publications

References 13 publications

Control Systems for the Power Grid and Their Resiliency to Attacks

Control Systems for the Power Grid and Their Resiliency to Attacks

Security of Information Flow in the Electric Power Grid

Cyber risk modeling and attack-resilient control for power grid

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