Analysis of the Development of the Public Procurement in the Czech Republic in the Years 2008-2015

Chmelová, Pavla; Štípek, Vladimír

doi:10.18267/j.polek.1146

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The authors conclude that it is challenging to introduce substantial requirements for the protection of the welfare and population health in the procurement of social services. Chmelová and Štípek (2017) Kabir and Ghazali (2009) examined the risks associated with long-term concession contracts related to the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects, such as the National Health Service (NHS) hospitals. The authors tested several methods to eliminate project-related risks while also identifying several risks related to procurement processes.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation of selected determinants of public procurement in the health sector

Gavurová¹,

Mikeska²,

Huculová³

2020

RAMP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article aims at anexaminationof the impact of the number of public procurement tenders in the healthcare sector on the final purchase price. We used the data from 1544 public contracts related to the acquisition of health technologies for the years 2014-2017. The highest number of public contracts was reached at level of 501 in 2014, and the lowest number was 238 in 2017. The highest average value of estimated and final prices was found in 2015. The proportion of tenders submitted with only one tenderer was over 39 %. For the analysis, we used a generalized linear model and quantile regression. The results showed that, as the number of bids increased by one unit, the ratio of final and projected price on average would change 0.975 times, which means an increase in savings by 2.45%. Using quantile regression, we modelled the influenceof the explanatory variables on the individual quantiles of the explained variable instead of the conditional mean. The aim was to determine the impact of the number of proposals at everyovercharge level. As the order value of the quantile increases, the effect of offers on generating savings in public procurement is gradually decreasing. For more than 40 % of the most overpriced orders, the number of offers does not have a statistically significant effect on the size of the savings. With 25 % of the most economical orders with an increasing number of bids by one unit, savings of 4.77 % were achieved. However, increasing the number of procurement contracts to create savings in public procurement may develop differently over time. By applying the generalized linear model, we found that in 2014 the increase in the number of offers by one unit had an impact on the average increase in public procurement savings of 7.15 %. In 2015, this impact fell to 1.59 %. In 2016, the growth in the number of proposals did not have a statistically significant impact on the average increase or decrease in savings. In 2017, this value increased slightly above 1.96 %. Public acquisition processes will continue to be a critical pointfor the efficient allocation of public resources.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation of selected determinants of public procurement in the health sector

Gavurová¹,

Mikeska²,

Huculová³

2020

RAMP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Political donations and the allocation of public procurement contracts

Titl

Geys

2019

European Economic Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study whether and when firms' donations to political parties induce favouritism in public procurement allocations. Our analysis builds on a unique, comprehensive dataset covering all public procurement contracts and all corporate donations to major political parties in the Czech Republic over the period from 2007 to 2014, and exploits changes in political control over regional governments within this period for identification purposes. We find that firms donating 10% more to a political party gaining (losing) power witness an increase (decrease) in the value of their public procurement contracts by 0.5 to 0.6%. Importantly, and in line with theoretical expectations, these effects only arise for contracts allocated under less restrictive procurement allocation processes. Assessing the underlying mechanisms, we show that donating firms receive more small contracts allocated under less regulated procurement procedures, face less competition in more regulated and open procurement procedures, and tend to win with bids further above the estimated cost of the procurement contract.

show abstract

Analysis of the Development of the Public Procurement in the Czech Republic in the Years 2008-2015

Cited by 2 publications

References 6 publications

Evaluation of selected determinants of public procurement in the health sector

Evaluation of selected determinants of public procurement in the health sector

Political donations and the allocation of public procurement contracts

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About