Analysis of the Impact of Denial of Service Attacks on Centralized Control in Smart Cities

Abstract

The increasing threat of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks targeting Smart City systems impose unprecedented challenges in terms of service availability, especially against centralized control platforms due to their single point of failure issue. The European ARTEMIS co-funded project ACCUS (Adaptive Cooperative Control in Urban (sub)Systems) is focused on a centralized Integration and Coordination Platform (ICP) for urban subsystems to enable real-time collaborative applications across them and optimize their combined performance in Smart Cities. Hence, any outage of the ACCUS ICP, due to DoS attacks, can severely affect not only the interconnected subsystems but also the citizens. Consequently, it is of utmost importance for ACCUS ICP to be protected with the appropriate defense mechanisms against these attacks. Towards this direction, the measurement of the performance degradation of the attacked ICP server can be used for the selection of the most appropriate defense mechanisms. However, the suitable metrics are required to be defined. Therefore, this paper models and analyzes the impact of DoS attacks on the queue management temporal performance of the ACCUS ICP server in terms of system delay by using queueing theory.

A model developed for teaching an adaptive system of recognising cyberattacks among non-uniform queries in information systems

“…The source data were the results of measuring the parameters of the received incoming streams in the SM. The simulation and the analytical calculation [3,4,[21][22][23]25, 26] of the bandwidth used in the CIS or MCIS were conducted for different sets of heterogeneous implementations of the streams k 1 and k 3 . Table 1 shows the data obtained during the simulation experiment -the time of the delay and the probability of the query loss, as well as the comparative parameters of the expected features.…”

“…There are studies on models and algorithms for detection of cyberattacks that take into account queries in modules of "client-bank" systems, electronic invoices and communication systems [4,5], the flow rate of requirements [6,7], the interval between the requirements [8,9], and the types of queries [10][11][12]. However, these studies do not consider the use of information systems of a variable structure, including the ones equipped with multiple servers and cyberdefence components, that are able to deal with a complex behaviour of query queues in terms of their heterogeneity (conflict).…”

“…Narrowly focused, systematic and shared attacks, which are known as persistent sophisticated threats, are able to hide from anti-viruses and are not detected by firewalls and intrusion detection systems [9,17,22]. These targeted threats either have no signatures or are well disguised [4,23].…”

“…2. A functional diagram of cyberattacks with mixed flows of queries: S 1 is the entry into a CIS or MCIS, S 2 is the scan of the available resources (AR) in a CIS or MCIS, S 3 is the waiting for the response about the presence of AR, S 4 is the connection to the AR, S 5 is the data transmission in the CIS or MCIS, S 6 is the data transmission to the available resources (automated workstations (AWSs) or personal computers (PCs), and S 7 is the loading of the query dispatch to the servers of the CIS or MCIS by using a nonlocal way. Any query stream k j in the system is described as a random sequence of the vector {(…”

Secure transmission technique for data in IoT edge computing infrastructure

“…The most important part for policymakers is to understand that 'smart' can be taken in many ways [67]. As the smart city contains different types of sensors and computers are embedded in the system that is prone to deceive, deviation, malicious nodes, and outside attack [68][69][70][71].…”