Analysis on the Influencing Factors of Farmers’ Cognition on the Function of Agricultural Water Price—Taking Hexi Corridor as an Example

Qu, Wei; Jin, Yan; Tan, Yanmei; Tu, Qin

doi:10.3390/su13095197

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Conversely, excessively high water prices make it difficult for farmers to afford water and may lead to reluctant participation in the reform. (4) Appropriate government water conservation incentives and financial subsidies for farmers and water supply units can reduce the input costs of farmers and water supply units for the reform, and a clear compensation mechanism for agricultural water can incentive farmers to save more water [61], thus regulating the behaviors of farmers in water use and guaranteeing the income of farmers [62]. At the same time, appropriate penalties can be imposed on farmers who passively cooperate with the reform and on water supply units that fail to provide quality water supply services in accordance with the provisions of the law [63] to enable farmers and water supply units to actively and quickly participate in the reform.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Co-Evolutionary Mechanism of Stakeholders’ Strategies in Comprehensive Agricultural Water Price Reform: The View of Evolutionary Game Based on Prospect Theory

Zhang

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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In today’s world, the contradiction between water supply and demand is becoming increasingly pronounced, with a particular emphasis on the severe shortage of water for agricultural purposes. As a result, it has become imperative to promote the comprehensive reform of agricultural water pricing and increase water conservation awareness among water users. However, during the actual promotion process, the conflicting interests among stakeholders often create a behavioral game that seriously hinders the effective implementation of the agricultural water price reform. Therefore, it is crucial to address this conflict of interest and find ways to overcome it in order to ensure the successful implementation of the agricultural water pricing reform. In order to explore the dynamic evolution process of the behavior and decision making of the stakeholders in the comprehensive agricultural water price reform and the influencing factors and to propose relevant strategies to effectively promote the reform. This article constructs a three-party game model based on MA-PT theory with the government, farmers, and water supply units as the main subjects, solves the equation with the perceived benefit matrix instead of the traditional benefit matrix, and calculates the objective conditions for reaching the steady state. The simulation results show that the behavioral decision of the game subject to participate in the reform will be influenced by their perception of gains and losses, and there is a mutual influence between the three strategic choices. Therefore, the reform of agricultural water prices should consider the affordability of farmers and water supply units. The government appropriately adopts a reward system to encourage farmers and water supply units to actively participate in the reform to play a positive role and appropriate penalties for promoting the reform, the early realization of the reform goals, and the development of water-saving agriculture.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%