Anatomy of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism

Hughes, Geraint; Tripodi, Christian

doi:10.1080/09592310802571552

Cited by 49 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The leadership of AQAP is only too well aware that al-Sawah-the emergence of an alliance between tribal groupings and their previous nemesis, the United States Marine Corps across the Iraqi province of al-Anbar in February 2007-was regarded as integral to the success of the wider surge against Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups. 40 Led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq had done much to alienate the tribes by their brutal and harsh imposition of a Salafi order that brooked no compromise with tribalism as the primary source of social and political authority. As Zvi Bar'el notes, AQAP have learned from this mistake:…”

Section: Revolt Up Above Secession Down Belowmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Tribes that Bind: Yemen and the Paradox of Political Violence

Jones

2011

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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Section: Revolt Up Above Secession Down Belowmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Tribes that Bind: Yemen and the Paradox of Political Violence

Jones

2011

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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“…A longstanding critique within the academic literature has been that supporting non-state forces can detract from long-term state-building by exacerbating competition for power and legitimacy in a state already struggling to maintain authority and control (Hughes and Tripodi 2009). This argument has emerged forcefully in discussions of the growing power of the PMF and the decreasing perceived legitimacy and strength of the ISF (Sowell 2015b;Mansour 2016a).…”

Section: Undermining the Iraqi Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Backgrounder: Literature Review of Local, Regional or Sub-State Defense Forces in Iraq

Gaston¹,

Derzsi-Horvath²,

Toorn³

et al. 2017

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Regional or community forces, militias, and other forms of local security actors have long existed in Iraq, supported either by local political actors or parties, regional actors, or non-state groups. However, in the last two years, these local and hybrid security forces have proliferated. Peshmerga forces and a range of Shia and tribal militia forces, or local defense forces could be quickly mobilized to counter the threat posed by ISIL and fill gaps in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). What has been the impact of these groups for community and political dynamics, prospects for stabilization in liberated areas, and other rule of law, governance, and rights concerns? What will be the future position of these groups after the immediate crisis is resolved, and how will the greater reliance on these quasi-or non-state actors impact the long-term prospects for the Iraqi state?

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“…The police, namely the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), now the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), various military units, the Security Service (MI5) and to a lesser degree, the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), all participated in the recruitment and running of informants inside both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary organizations (Hughes & Tripodi, 2009;Taylor, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%