And the Heat Goes On: Police Repression and the Modalities of Power

What are the effects of state repression on public perceptions of police? And to what extent are these effects uniform or conditional on individuals’ loyalty to political authorities? I argue that repression by the police negatively affects how people evaluate the police, especially among those who do not support the ruling party. People who oppose the regime are more likely to fear the police following a repressive event relative to regime supporters. To test this argument, I leverage a unique research design opportunity that emerges from the social media tax protest led by Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu (also known as Bobi Wine) and subsequent selective repression by the Uganda Police Force while a nationally representative survey on police and security was being administered in Uganda. I demonstrate selective repression of protesters decreased support for the police. These effects are largely driven by political loyalty; repression has a stronger effect on how members of the opposition evaluate the police relative to incumbent supporters.

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Repression Affects Public Perceptions of Police: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Uganda

Curtice

2021

“…Reactive repression responds to existing acts of dissent and uses violence to limit further challenges to the regime. By contrast, preventive repression attempts to curb mobilization before challenges can take to the street (Danneman and Ritter, 2014; Ritter and Conrad, 2016; De Jaegher and Hoyer, 2019; Dragu and Przeworski, 2019; Liu and Sullivan, 2021; Esberg, 2021). State leaders prefer prevention to reaction as preventive measures mitigate their risk of being overthrown, but this preference depends on whether states have enough information and capacity to anticipate challenges and root them out before they can take place.…”

Section: Information and State Repressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dissent Networks, State Repression, and Strategic Clemency for Defection

Liu

2022

Self Cite

Why do governments severely punish some dissidents while showing mercy to others? This study argues that when constrained by limited information on dissent, states have incentives to cast the net of repression wider by executing not just key dissent actors but also members closely connected to them to ensure demobilization. States also crave information, and granting clemency to defectors who bring in information improves state intelligence. Given that tips have different values, regimes will grant clemency to defectors who are closely connected to key dissent actors and possess high-value tips, allowing the state to pursue top fugitives and dissolve resistance more efficiently. Using newly declassified data on political victims during Taiwan’s White Terror authoritarian period, I find that the regime tends to execute both key actors (i.e., leaders and recruiters) and their closely connected members. Defectors who share information tend to receive mercy, but defectors closely connected to key actors are much less likely to face execution than less connected defectors. These findings shed new insight into the toolkit dictators use to gather intelligence on dissent and how strategic clemency induces defection and betrayal among dissidents, helping destroy dissent networks from within.

“…The PSU played an integral role in our field experiment, as discussed below. The LNP also adopted new “modalities” for engaging with civilian populations, with the goal of drawing citizens into more routine contact with the state security apparatus, repairing damaged police/community relations, and enabling more proactive responses to threats (Arriola et al forthcoming; Liu and Sullivan forthcoming). The Confidence Patrols program that we evaluate, and which we describe in more detail below, is one example of these new modalities at work.…”

Section: Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We argue that citizens in general, and victims of state-perpetrated violence in particular, will only update their priors when they observe the fruits of reform firsthand, by engaging with newly reformed police officers on a face-to-face, day-to-day basis. This form of engagement may also enable the police to respond more proactively to threats (Arriola et al forthcoming; Liu and Sullivan forthcoming), which may further improve police/community relations.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Policing and the Legacies of Wartime State Predation: Evidence from a Survey and Field Experiment in Liberia

Blair

Morse

2021

How does violence during civil war shape citizens’ willingness to trust and rely on state security providers in the post-conflict period? Can post-conflict security sector reform restore perceptions of state security forces among victims of wartime state predation? Using a survey and field experiment in Liberia, we show that rebel-perpetrated violence is strongly positively correlated with trust and reliance on the police after conflict is over, while state-perpetrated violence is not. Victims of wartime state predation are, however, more likely to update their priors about the police in response to positive interactions with newly reformed police officers. We also show that abuses committed by police officers in the post-conflict period are negatively correlated with citizens’ perceptions of the police, potentially counteracting the positive effects of security sector reform. We corroborate our quantitative findings with detailed qualitative observations of interactions between civilians and police officers in the field.